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495 
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE  
AND ORIGINALISM: 




“Marry, Sir, they have committed false report” 
 —WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING, act 5, sc. 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
When a national children’s rights organization asked me to 
draft an amicus brief in Davis v. Washington1 to alert the 
Supreme Court to the impact its decision interpreting the 
Confrontation Clause may have on child abuse prosecutions, I 
had no idea it was going to thrust me back in time to the laws 
and practices of seventeenth and eighteenth century England. It 
was not long, however, before I made the acquaintance of Sir 
                                                          
* Attorney, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, D.C.; Adjunct Professor 
of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. The author thanks 
Brooklyn Law School for inviting him to participate in this symposium.  He 
also thanks symposium participant Professor Thomas Davies, for providing 
guidance on historical sources and invaluable comments on this article. 
Thanks also to Professor Sheila B. Scheuerman and Professor Daniel 
Barnhizer for comments on earlier drafts. Additional thanks to Kathleen 
Prince from MSU’s library and Ann Greenwood from Arnold & Porter 
LLP’s London office library for research assistance. All errors, of course, 
are solely those of the author. The views expressed herein are solely those of 
the author and not those of Arnold & Porter LLP or any of the firm’s clients. 
1 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). The Davis decision addressed two cases 
argued in tandem, Washington v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (en 
banc) and Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). This article 
refers to the cases collectively as “Davis.” 
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Walter Raleigh, the Privy Council, and the Marian statutes. 
History, I was reminded, has become central to confrontation 
doctrine since the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. 
Washington.2 And not just any history. Justice Scalia, writing 
for the Crawford majority, made clear that what matters is the 
“original meaning” of the Confrontation Clause—an 
interpretation “faithful to the Framers’ understanding.”3 
In Crawford, the defendant was tried for attempted murder, 
and the Court addressed whether the admission of a recorded 
statement by the defendant’s wife, who did not testify at trial 
because of a state law marital privilege, violated the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment confrontation right.4 Finding the existing 
confrontation framework “unpredictable,” “amorphous,” and 
inconsistent with “historical principles,”5 the Crawford Court 
crafted a new confrontation test that distinguishes between 
“testimonial” and “nontestimonial” hearsay: 
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly 
consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the 
States flexibility in their development of hearsay 
                                                          
2 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3 Id. at 59-60. 
4 Id. at 38, 40, 68. 
5 Id. at 60-63. In Crawford, the Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980), which “condition[ed] the admissibility of all hearsay 
evidence on whether it falls under a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or 
bears ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’” Id. at 60 (quoting 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). The Court determined that the Roberts framework 
conflated the constitutional requirements with the law of hearsay, strayed 
from historic principles, and was inherently flawed: 
[The Roberts reliability] framework is so unpredictable that it 
fails to provide meaningful protection from even core 
confrontation violations.  Reliability is an amorphous, if not 
entirely subjective, concept . . . . The unpardonable vice of the 
Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its 
demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that 
the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude. 
Id. at 63; accord Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1179 (2007) 
(discussing Crawford overruling Roberts in the context of finding that the 
Crawford rule could not be applied retroactively). 
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law . . . . Where testimonial evidence is at issue, 
however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the 
common law required: unavailablity and a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.6 
Two years later, Davis presented the Court’s first 
opportunity to define the parameters of “testimonial,” something 
Crawford expressly left “for another day.”7 At issue in Davis 
was whether a recording of a 911 call as well as an affidavit and 
hearsay statements made during a police interview admitted at 
trial in two domestic violence cases were “testimonial.”8 
Adhering to Crawford’s originalist approach,9 the parties’ and 
amici’s briefs in Davis focused on framing-era history. 
Nearly all of the Davis briefs10 discussed a 1779 child rape 
                                                          
6 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
7 Id. (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive 
definition of ‘testimonial.”). 
8 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2270-73 (2006) (describing 
background of Washington v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) 
and Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), which were argued in 
tandem and decided in one opinion). 
9 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
10 See Brief of Petitioner Hershel Hammon, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 
05-5705), 2005 WL 3597706; Brief of Respondent, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 
(No. 05-5705), 2006 WL 271825; Reply Brief of Petitioner Hershel 
Hammon, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5705), 2006 WL 615151; Brief 
for Petitioner, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5224), 2005 WL 3598182; 
Brief of Respondent, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5224), 2006 WL 
271825; Reply Brief for Petitioner, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (No. 05-5224), 
2006 WL 542177. For the amici briefs that discuss Brasier, see Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 
2266 (No. 05-5224), 2006 WL 303911; Brief for the States of Illinois et al. 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (Nos. 
05-5224, 05-5705), 2006 WL 303912; Brief of Amicus Curiae, the National 
Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) in Support of Respondents, 
Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (Nos. 05-5224, 05-5705), 2006 WL 284227. The 
author was counsel of record for amicus NACC and would like to thank 
Professor Thomas D. Lyon of the University of Southern California Law 
School as well as Raymond LaMagna and Jacob Smiles for their contributions 
to the brief, including some of the initial research on Brasier discussed in this 
article. 
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case, King v. Brasier.11 In Brasier, Mary Harris, a child under 
seven years old, “immediately on her coming home,” told her 
mother and a woman lodging in the home that the defendant had 
sexually assaulted her.12 At the defendant’s trial for assault with 
intent to commit a rape, the child “was not sworn or produced 
as a witness.”13 Mary’s mother and the lodger, however, 
testified that Mary told them she had been assaulted and had 
identified the defendant as the perpetrator. The jury convicted 
the defendant,14 but the trial judge referred the case to the 
Twelve Judges for review, a practice analogous to a modern day 
appeal.15 The Twelve Judges unanimously reversed the 
conviction, holding that “no testimony whatever can be legally 
received except upon oath” and “therefore, that the evidence of 
the information which the infant had given to her mother and the 
other witness, ought not to have been received.”16 
The defendants in Davis naturally argued that Brasier 
proved, at common law, hearsay statements made “immediately” 
after an assault were characterized as “testimony” forbidden 
from evidence.17 Thus, they reasoned, Brasier showed that the 
911 call and statements to the police—even if considered excited 
utterances—would be “testimonial” and barred from evidence in 
1779, over a decade before ratification of the Confrontation 
Clause in 1791.18 
                                                          
11 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 1 Leach 199 (K.B. 1779). 
12 Id. at 202, 1 Leach at 200. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 As Professor Langbein has explained, “[w]hen a point of difficultly 
arose that a trial judge was reluctant to decide on his own . . . the judge 
could defer sentencing and refer the question to a meeting held back in 
London of all the judges, commonly twelve, of the three common law 
courts.” JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 
212-13 (2003). 
16 Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202-03, 1 Leach at 200. 
17 See infra text accompanying notes 31-35. 
18 Id. Although the Supreme Court often treats “original meaning” as an 
inquiry into the generally accepted meaning that a provision in the Bill of 
Rights had at the time of ratification in 1791, some argue that 1789, the date 
the Sixth Amendment was framed, is the appropriate cut-off date. See infra 
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Writing for the Davis majority, Justice Scalia found no need 
to address any spontaneous declaration exception to 
confrontation and instead adopted a new standard for 
“testimonial”—limited to the situations presented—that focused 
on whether the “primary purpose” of the out-of-court statement 
was to assist police in responding to an “ongoing emergency.”19 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, however, did briefly mention Brasier,20 
implicitly suggesting that the case may be instructive to 
confrontation issues in other contexts, including one of the 
principal questions Davis left unresolved: whether statements 
made to private individuals rather than government officials can 
ever be “testimonial.”21 
                                                          
notes 152-54 and accompanying text. 
19 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006). In Davis, the 
Court adopted the following test, limiting it to the factual contexts presented 
in the cases: 
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all 
conceivable statements . . . it suffices to decide the present cases 
to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in 
the course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, 
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish 
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution. 
Id. The Court held that the 911 recording admitted against defendant Davis 
was nontestimonial under this test because, “the circumstances of [the 
victim’s] interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Id. at 2277. The Court 
found the affidavit and hearsay admitted against defendant Hammon, 
however, was “testimonial” since it was “entirely clear from the 
circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly 
past criminal conduct . . . . There was no emergency in progress . . . . 
Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the 
interrogation was to investigate a possible crime . . . .” Id. at 2278. 
20 Id. at 2277. 
21 In Davis, the Court expressly declined to address whether statements 
to non-law enforcement personnel can ever be testimonial: “For the purposes 
of this opinion (and without deciding the point), we consider [911 operators’] 
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Part I of this article traces the common law before and after 
Brasier and argues that the case has no place in confrontation 
doctrine, under an originalist approach or otherwise.22 When 
read in context, Brasier is not about confrontation at all. Rather, 
the case concerns unique framing-era law governing the 
competency of children to take the oath and give sworn—or 
unsworn—testimony at trial.23 More fundamentally, the report of 
Brasier discussed in Davis could not have influenced the 
Framers’ understanding of confrontation because it was not in 
print until 1815, over two decades after the framing and 
ratification of the Sixth Amendment. The 1815 report was a 
revised version of reports of the case in print from 1789 until 
1799. The earlier versions made no mention of any hearsay and, 
indeed, reported that the child testified at trial, essentially taking 
the case outside the realm of confrontation.24 
It is plausible, moreover, that the Framers would not have 
been aware of any report of Brasier and—given the legal 
authorities that were available in framing-era America—would 
have understood that hearsay accounts by parents, doctors, and 
acquaintances concerning statements made by child sexual abuse 
victims would be admissible in criminal trials without regard to 
whether the statements would now be considered “testimonial” 
or “nontestimonial.”25 
Part II argues that Brasier serves as an apt case study on 
some of the practical limits of originalism as a basis for criminal 
procedure.26 That the entire debate over Brasier is based on a 
                                                          
acts to be acts of the police.  As in Crawford, therefore, our holding today 
makes it unnecessary to consider whether and when statements made to 
someone other than law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’” Id. at 2274 
n.2 (citation omitted). 
22 See infra Part I.C-D. 
23 See infra Part I.C.1. 
24 See infra Part I.C.2. 
25 See infra Part I.C.2. 
26 Crawford prompted additional scholarship concerning the longstanding 
debate over originalism.  For articles critical of originalism or history in 
Crawford, see generally Thomas Y. Davies, Not “the Framers’ Design”: 
How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-
Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation 
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report of the case that did not exist in 1791—and that the 
original report eluded the parties, the Solicitor General’s office, 
amici, and the Supreme Court in Davis as well as most 
academics who have analyzed the case over the years—raises 
questions about a framework that essentially requires lawyers 
and judges to become amateur historians. To be sure, 
originalists readily acknowledge that there may be difficulties in 
determining original meaning and applying it to modern 
circumstances.27 Even so, that may discount the practical reality 
that criminal lawyers in the trenches—and the judges deciding 
these issues—cannot reasonably be expected to have the time to 
find, much less trace the origins of, each and every common law 
case that seems significant to the confrontation issue before 
them.  That is particularly the case given that many historical 
sources are not readily available without resort to specialized 
                                                          
Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Not the Framers’ 
Design]; Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did 
They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. 
L. REV. 105, 105, 156-62 (2005) [hereinafter Davies, What Did the Framers 
Know]; Thomas Y. Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in 
Crawford’s “Cross-Examination Rule”: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK L. 
REV. 557 (2007) [hereinafter Davies, Revisiting Fictional Originalism]; 
Kenneth Graham, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 209 (2005); 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6371.2 (Supp. 2006); 
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford v. 
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219 (2005); Rodger W. Kirst, Does 
Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 
BROOK L. REV. 35 (2005). For views supporting originalism or the history in 
Crawford, see Robert Kry, Confrontation under the Marian Statutes: A 
Response to Professor Davies, 72 BROOK L. REV. 493 (2007); Stepanos 
Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of 
Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 
183 (2005). 
27 E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 45-46 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (“The difficulties 
and uncertainties of determining original meaning and applying it to modern 
circumstances are negligible compared with the difficulties and uncertainties 
of the philosophy which says that the Constitution changes . . . . The 
originalist, if he does not have all the answers, has many of them. The 
Confrontation Clause, for example, requires confrontation.”). 
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subscription databases or rare book collections.  Given the 
nature of the sources, it may even be possible for advocates with 
time and resources to construct a compelling case of “original 
meaning” for either side of an issue. 
All of this is not to say that history is irrelevant to an 
understanding of confrontation or other rights. Nor is the fact 
that a legal framework is difficult to apply necessarily a sound 
basis to abandon it. Still, the question remains whether the real-
world limitations of anchoring a legal framework rigidly to 
“original meaning” will result in shorthand legal tests, selective 
advocacy, results-oriented decision-making, and the very 
“unpredictable” and “amorphous” framework Crawford sought 
to replace.   
I.  MUCH ADO ABOUT BRASIER 
A.  The Brasier Case 
The Brasier case as set forth in the English Reports and 
discussed by the litigants and Supreme Court in Davis is short 
enough to set forth in full: 
This was a case reserved for the opinion of the 
Twelve Judges, by Mr. Justice Buller, at the Spring 
Assizes for Reading, in the year 1779, on the trial of 
an indictment for an assault with intent to commit a 
rape on the body of Mary Harris, an infant under 
seven years of age. 
The case against the prisoner was proved by the 
mother of the child, and by another woman who 
lodged with her, to whom the child, immediately on 
her coming home, told all the circumstances of the 
injury which had been done to her: and there was no 
fact or circumstance to confirm the information which 
the child had given, except that the prisoner lodged at 
the very place which she had described, and that she 
had received some hurt, and that she, on seeing him 
the next day, had declared that he was the man; but 
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she was not sworn or produced as a witness on the 
trial. 
The prisoner was convicted; but the judgment was 
respited, on a doubt, created by a marginal note to a 
case in Dyer’s Reports (Dyer, 303, b, in marg; 1 
Hale, 302, 634; 2 Hale, 279; 11 Mod. 228; 1 Atkins, 
29; Foster, 70; 2 Hawk. 612; Gilb. L. E. 144); for 
these notes having been made by Lord Chief-Justice 
Treby, are considered of great weight and authority; 
and it was submitted to the Twelve Judges, Whether 
this evidence was sufficient in point of law? 
The Judges assembled at Serjeants’-Inn Hall 29 April 
1779, were unanimously of opinion, That no 
testimony whatever can be legally received except 
upon oath; and that an infant, though under the age of 
seven years, may be sworn in a criminal prosecution, 
provided such infant appears, on strict examination by 
the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the 
nature and consequences of an oath (see White’s case, 
post, 430, Old Bailey October Session, 1786), for 
there is no precise or fixed rule as to the time within 
which infants are excluded from giving evidence; but 
their admissibility depends upon the sense and reason 
they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood, 
which is to be collected from their answers to 
questions propounded to them by the Court; but if 
they are found incompetent to take an oath, their 
testimony cannot be received. The Judges determined, 
therefore, that the evidence of the information which 
the infant had given to her mother and the other 
witness, ought not to have been received.—The 
prisoner received a pardon (see the case of Rex v. 
Travers, 2 Strange, 700).28 
                                                          
28 King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03, 1 Leach 199, 199-200 
(K.B. 1779). As discussed infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text, the 
report on Brasier changed over time. The litigants and Court in Davis cited 
only the version reprinted in the English Reports. 
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B.  How Brasier Became a Topic of Debate 
Only recently did Brasier become a significant topic of 
confrontation discourse. It was not cited by the Crawford 
majority29 and for the two years following Crawford, little was 
said in cases or commentary about Brasier.30 
In Davis, however, the defendants argued that Brasier 
supported reversal of their convictions, each focusing primarily 
                                                          
29 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, cited Brasier in his concurring 
opinion. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69-70 (2004) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist used Brasier to support his 
argument that the majority’s “distinction between testimonial and 
nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better rooted in history 
than our current doctrine.” Id. at 69. Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
cited Brasier for the proposition that at common law “out-of-court statements 
made by someone other than the accused and not taken under oath . . . were 
generally not considered substantive evidence upon which a conviction could 
be based.” Id.  Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the Framers thus would 
not have considered these statements in the same league as statements given 
under oath and likely would not have had the same concerns about the 
admission of unsworn statements, even “testimonial” ones. See id. at 70-71 
& n.4 (“[I]t is far from clear that courts in the late 18th century would have 
treated unsworn statements, even testimonial ones, the same as sworn 
statements.”). 
30 Westlaw’s legal databases from the date Crawford was decided in 
March 2004 until certiorari was granted in Davis in October 2005 reveal no 
citations or discussions of Brasier. On Confrontation Blog, however, 
Professor Richard D. Friedman noted, 
I have been commenting on very recent cases, but here is R. v. 
Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 E.R. 202, a case from 1779 that has 
been much cited over the years. It bears on the treatment not 
only of fresh accusations but also of statements made by 
children and of accusations made to private care-givers. The 
report is as it stands in the English Reports, later annotations 
and all. 
See R. v. Brasier—a classic case from 1779, http://confrontationright. 
blogspot.com/2005_12_01_archive.html (Dec. 24, 2005. 04:15 EST). After 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Davis, a justice on the Montana 
Supreme Court issued a dissenting opinion citing Brasier, among other 
sources, in support of the view that statements can be testimonial even if 
made to a non-government official or agent. See State v. Mizenko, 127 P.3d 
458, 481 (Mont. 2006) (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
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on the Twelve Judges’ determination that “no testimony 
whatever can be legally received except upon oath”31 and 
“therefore, that the evidence of the information which the infant 
had given to her mother and the other witness, ought not to have 
been received.”32 These statements, the defendants argued, 
proved two main propositions.  First, that the out-of-court 
accusatory statements made by young Mary Harris over a 
decade before the Confrontation Clause’s ratification were 
characterized as “testimony” and should not have been admitted 
in evidence at trial. Second, Mary Harris’s hearsay statements 
were excluded even though they were made “immediately” after 
the alleged offense, refuting any “excited utterance” or 
spontaneous declaration exception to confrontation at common 
law. Defendant Hammon made a more expansive argument, 
suggesting that Brasier showed that statements made to non-
government personnel can be “testimonial” and fall within the 
scope of the Confrontation Clause: 
The manifest premise of the judges’ discussion [in 
Brasier] was that if the speaker had been an adult it 
would have been plainly improper for other persons 
to relay her accusations—her “testimony”—to 
court . . . . Brasier clearly reflects the law of its 
time, and it held squarely against admissibility 
notwithstanding the presence of several factors, 
absent in [this] case, that might have been argued to 
point the other way—the demonstration of 
immediacy, and the facts that the speaker was a child, 
that her audience was not government officials, and 
that she was not responding to questioning. 
Thus, at the time of the Framing, there was no 
special rule allowing admissibility of accusatorial 
statements because they were made under the stress 
of excitement.33 
                                                          
31 King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202, 1 Leach 199, 200 (K.B. 
1779). 
32 Id. at 203, 1 Leach at 200. 
33 Brief of Petitioner Hershel Hammon, supra note 10, at *27-28 
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In response to arguments by amici, both defendants 
acknowledged that eighteenth century trials in London’s Old 
Bailey court reflected repeated instances where child hearsay 
concerning sexual abuse was admitted into evidence.34 Each, 
however, argued that Brasier “changed the rules, holding that 
sufficiently mature children could testify at trial, characterizing 
the out-of-court accusation made by the child there as 
testimonial, and so excluding it.”35 
                                                          
(footnote omitted). Hammon’s reply brief reiterated that Brasier illustrated “a 
non-controversial understanding that (putting aside the age of the child) the 
accusation was testimonial in nature . . . .” Reply Brief of Petitioner Hershel 
Hammon, supra note 10, at *8 n.9. Hammon also acknowledged, however, 
that “[h]ow this history should now affect admission of statements made by 
children is, of course, a question that this Court need not reach here. Other 
considerations as well, not presented here, might affect how the confrontation 
right is applied with respect to child witnesses.” Id. at *8 n.10 (citing 
Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation 
Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1280-85 (2003)). Hammon’s counsel, 
Professor Friedman, as well as other academics, have recognized that 
different considerations may apply when the statements are by children. See 
Richard D. Friedman, Grappling With the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 241, 272-73 (2005); Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum 
of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 
249-52 (2002); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors Sherman J. 
Clark, James J. Duane, Richard D. Friedman, Norman Garland, Gary M. 
Maveal, Bridget McCormack, David A. Moran, Christopher B. Mueller, and 
Roger C. Park, in Support of Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754958, at *22 n.12; Brief Amicus 
Curiae of the ACLU and the ACLU of Virginia, in Support of Petitioner, 
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (No. 98-5881), 1998 WL 901782, at 
*26 & n.44. Though the history surrounding Brasier suggests that out-of-
court statements of children should receive special treatment under the 
Confrontation Clause, that issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
34 Reply Brief of Petitioner Hershel Hammon, supra note 10, at *8; 
Reply Brief for Petitioner [Davis], supra note 10, at *9. 
35 Reply Brief of Petitioner Hershel Hammon, supra note 10, at *7-8; 
accord Reply Brief for Petitioner [Davis], supra note 10, at *9 (“The NACC 
brief (at 19-21), mentions other Old Bailey cases involving children’s 
statements to family members, but the King’s Bench implicitly disapproved 
these cases in [Brasier]. There, the full King’s Bench held that children’s out-
of-court accusations were admissible only if they testified.  Since the victim 
there had not been, in fact, ‘sworn or produced as a witness at trial,’ her 
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The Court in Davis did not address any of these arguments. 
It did, however, make one reference to Brasier. Responding to 
defendant Davis’s argument that Brasier supported treating the 
victim’s statements to the 911 operator as testimonial, the Court 
said that Brasier “would be helpful to Davis if the relevant 
statement had been the girl’s screams for aid as she was being 
chased by her assailant. But by the time the victim got home, 
her story was an account of past events.”36 
Professor Friedman, counsel for one of the defendants in 
Davis and a leading confrontation scholar, has interpreted this 
reference in Davis as an “apparent endorsement” of Brasier.37 
Friedman argues that the reference is significant because 
“neither the immediacy of the statement, the youth of the 
declarant, nor the private status of the audience removes the 
statement from the protections of the confrontation right, and 
that is as it should be.”38 
Already, a state high court has relied on the Court’s 
reference to Brasier to support its holding that statements to 
non-law enforcement personnel can be “testimonial”:39 
[I]n Davis the Court cited as authority decisions 
suggesting that statements made to non-law-
enforcement individuals may be testimonial and also 
be subject to Confrontation Clause limitations . . . . 
Furthermore, the Court said that readers should not 
infer from the opinion that “statements made in the 
absence of any interrogation are necessarily 
                                                          
accusatory statement was inadmissible.”). 
36 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006). 
37 Richard D. Friedman, We Really (For the Most Part) Mean It!, 105 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 5 (2006), http://students.law.umich. 
edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/friedman.pdf. 
38 Id. at 5; accord Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way 
Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553, 564 (2007) (“[N]otwithstanding the 
immediacy of the report—and notwithstanding the facts that the declarant was 
a young child and that her audience included no law enforcement officers—
the statement was testimonial. Significantly, that is just how the Brasier court 
referred to the child’s accusation, as testimony.”). 
39 See discussion supra note 21. 
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nontestimonial.” Until the U.S. Supreme Court holds 
otherwise, we interpret the Court’s remarks to imply 
that statements made to someone other than law 
enforcement personnel may also be properly 
characterized as testimonial.40 
What Brasier means, therefore, is not simply a matter of 
academic debate. But to understand the true meaning of the case 
(to the extent possible), it must be read in the context of the law 
of the time. 
C.  What Brasier Really Means (Probably) 
Though academics debate the nuances of “originalism,” the 
Supreme Court often treats “original meaning” as an inquiry 
into the generally accepted meaning that a provision in the Bill 
of Rights had at the time of ratification in 1791.41 In Crawford, 
the Court examined the laws and practices of sixteenth through 
eighteenth century England, as well as early post-ratification 
state decisions that “shed light upon the original understanding 
of the common law right.”42 Though Davis arguably retreated 
somewhat from Crawford’s detailed historical focus,43 the Court 
still sought to divine how the common law would treat the out-
of-court statements at issue.44 
If the same analysis is applied to Brasier, the relevance of 
the case to the Sixth Amendment confrontation right largely 
collapses. Contextually, the Brasier statement, “no testimony 
whatever can be legally received except upon oath,”45 did not 
                                                          
40 West Virginia v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 323 n.10 (W. Va. 2006) 
(citations omitted). 
41 Davies, What Did the Framers Know, supra note 26, at 105, 156-62 
(noting that Supreme Court opinions often refer to the 1791 ratification date 
but sometimes instead refer to the “framing” or “drafters” and 1789). 
42 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004). 
43 Cf. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 n.5 (2006) 
(“Restricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it 
was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.”). 
44 Id. 
45 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202, 1 Leach 199, 199 (K.B. 1779). 
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characterize the child’s hearsay statements as “testimony,” or, 
for that matter, even refer to the child’s statements at all. 
Further, the testimony of the child’s mother and the lodger did 
not appear in any report until well after ratification, rendering 
post-ratification interpretations of Brasier on hearsay mostly 
irrelevant. 
1.  The Law Leading Up to Brasier 
To understand Brasier, the case must be read in the context 
of seventeenth and eighteenth century English law governing 
child competency. Before Brasier, courts followed a general rule 
that a child under nine years old was incapable of taking the 
oath and giving sworn testimony—effectively an irrebuttable 
presumption of incompetency. A leading case on the issue was 
Rex v. Travers, decided in 1726 (but first reported in 1755).46 
There, the defendant was indicted for the rape of a six-year-old 
girl, a capital offense.47 In the defendant’s first trial, the judge 
refused to swear the child as a witness, and the defendant was 
acquitted.48 Based on the same alleged conduct, the defendant 
was then re-indicted for “assault with intent to ravish,” a 
misdemeanor and non-capital offense.49 The Travers court 
                                                          
46 93 Eng. Rep. 793, 2 Strange 700 (K.B. 1726). The first two volumes 
of the Strange reporter were published in 1755. W. HAROLD MAXWELL AND 
LESLIE F. MAXWELL, A LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH 
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, ENGLISH LAW TO 1800 309 (2d ed. 1955). 
47 93 Eng. Rep. at 793, 2 Strange at 700. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. The indictment for a lesser offense after an acquittal was permitted 
during that time. As one commentator who studied rape trials during the 
eighteenth century explained: 
A court could try the rape defendant on either a felony or a 
misdemeanour charge, but not on both in the same trial.  This 
position had its support in the rule that those accused of felonies, 
unlike those accused of treason or misdemeanours, had, in theory 
at least, no right to be defended by counsel . . . . [T]he 
felony/misdemeanour rule was applied quite rigorously in the Old 
Bailey from the middle of the [eighteenth] century on . . . . 
. . . 
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considered whether the same general rule that prohibited 
children under nine years old to be sworn in capital cases also 
applied in trials for misdemeanor offenses.50 Chief Judge 
Raymond held that the same presumption of incompetency 
applied: 
[A] person who could not be a witness in the one 
case, could not in the other. The reason why the law 
prohibits the evidence of a child so young is, because 
the child cannot be presumed to distinguish betwixt 
right and wrong: no person has ever been admitted as 
a witness under the age of nine years, and very 
seldom under ten.51 
                                                          
Under the rules of double jeopardy which prevailed at the time, a 
defendant acquitted on a capital charge could subsequently be tried 
for the same fact, if the subsequent charge was non-capital.  Those 
acquitted of rape could be, and sometimes were, tried for the 
misdemeanour of assault with intent to commit rape. 
Antony E. Simpson, Vulnerability and the Age of Female Consent: Legal 
Innovation and Its Effect on Prosecutions for Rape In Eighteenth-Century 
London, in SEXUAL UNDERWORLDS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 181, 187-90 
(G.S. Rousseau & Roy Porter eds., Manchester Univ. Press (1987)). 
50 Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. at 793-94, 2 Strange at 700-01. 
51 Id. at 794, 2 Strange at 701. Two arguments were made in favor of 
allowing the child to be sworn: 
[1] Hale’s P.C. says, that the examination of one the age of nine 
years has been admitted: and [2] a case at the Old Bailey 1698, 
was cited, where upon such an indictment as this, Ward Chief 
Baron admitted one to be a witness, who was under the age of 
ten years, after the child had been examined about the nature of 
an oath and had given a reasonable account of it. 
Id., 2 Strange at 700-01. Chief Judge Raymond appeared to respond to each 
point, first by refuting reliance on the 1698 Old Bailey case that reportedly 
allowed a child to testify on the ground that a later Old Bailey case prohibited 
unsworn testimony.  Raymond noted that in a 1704 case, “this point was 
thoroughly debated in the case of one Steward, who was indicted upon two 
indictments for the rapes upon children” and the court barred the alleged 
victims aged ten and six years old from taking the oath. Id. at 794, 2 Strange 
at 701. He next noted that the only support existing for swearing a ten-year-
old was Hale’s treatise. Id. These points are relevant because the reporter 
annotations in Brasier cite to Travers and Hale. See King v. Brasier, 168 
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The court held that the child was not permitted to testify and 
“there not being evidence sufficient without her, the defendant 
was acquitted.”52 
The Travers case is relevant not only for its explicit holding 
establishing an irrebutable presumption of incompetency for 
children under a particular age, but also for its implicit holding 
on a companion issue: whether an incompetent child could 
provide testimony unsworn. Specifically, throughout the 
eighteenth century, debate and confusion existed over whether 
children who were incompetent to take the oath should 
nevertheless be permitted to testify unsworn in certain types of 
cases. The issue appears to have been prompted by an influential 
treatise of the era, Sir Matthew Hale’s The History of the Pleas 
of the Crown.53 Hale argued that children presumed incompetent 
to take the oath should be allowed, at least in child sexual abuse 
cases, to testify unsworn.54 Hale gave two principal reasons for 
allowing unsworn testimony. First, in a point with modern 
relevance,55 he argued that unsworn testimony should be allowed 
                                                          
Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03, 1 Leach 199, 200 (K.B. 1779); see also infra note 
108 and accompanying text. Finally, it is notable that a reporter’s footnote 
annotation in Travers references Brasier. Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. at 794 n.1, 2 
Strange at 701 n.1 (“(1) Sed vide Brazier’s case, where an infant of 5 years 
old was held a good witness by all the Judges, she appearing to be acquainted 
with the nature of the obligation of the oath.”). 
52 Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. at 794, 2 Strange at 701. 
53 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE [THE HISTORY 
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN] 634 (London, Prof’l Books Ltd. 1971) (1736). 
54 Id. Hale noted that unsworn testimony would not be sufficient to 
convict, but should be heard to provide the court information. Id. (“But if it 
be an infant of such tender years, that in point of discretion the court sees 
unfit to swear her, yet I think she ought to be heard without oath to give the 
court information, tho singly of itself it ought not to move the jury to convict 
the offender, nor is it in itself a sufficient testimony, because not upon oath, 
without concurrence of other proofs, that may render the thing 
probable . . . .”); accord 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 279 (“But in many cases 
an infant of tender years may be examined without oath, where the exigence 
of the case requires it, as in case of rape, buggery, witchcraft . . . .”). 
55 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (“Child 
abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part 
because there often are no witnesses except the victim.”). 
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because “[t]he nature of the offense, which is most times secret, 
and no other testimony can be had of the very doing of the fact, 
but the party upon whom it is committed . . . .”56 Second, and 
most notably, Hale argued that children should be permitted to 
testify unsworn because the law permitted admission of hearsay 
of children reporting abuse, so courts may as well hear from the 
children directly: 
Because if the child complain presently of the wrong 
done to her to the mother or other relations, their 
evidence upon oath shall be taken, yet it is but a 
narrative of what the child told them without oath, 
and there is much more reason for the court to hear 
the relation of the child herself, than to receive it as 
second-hand from those that swear they heard her say 
so; for such a relation may be falsified, or otherwise 
represented at the second-hand, than when it was first 
delivered.57 
Hale’s treatise, written sometime before 1676, but not 
published until 1736,58 was cited repeatedly for his arguments in 
favor of hearing unsworn testimony from child victims. Both 
William Blackstone and Francis Buller, who were among the 
Twelve Judges who decided Brasier in 1779, cited Hale’s 
arguments in their respective treatises. Various editions of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries from the first edition (of the relevant 
volume) in 1769 until the 1783 ninth English edition that was 
changed to reflect Brasier,59 provided as follows: 
                                                          
56 1 HALE, supra note 53, at 634. 
57 Id. at 634-35. Although advocating that courts allow child witnesses to 
testify unsworn, Hale stated that concurrent proof was still required to prove 
the offense and that sworn or unsworn testimony alone was insufficient to 
convict a defendant of rape. Id. at 635 (“But in both these cases, whether the 
infant be sworn or not, it is necessary to render their evidence credible, that 
there should be concurrent evidence to make out the fact, and not to ground a 
conviction singly upon such an accusation with or without oath of an 
infant.”). 
58 E.g., P.R. Glazebrook, Introduction to 1 HALE, supra note 53. 
59 See discussion infra text accompanying note 117 (quoting 1783 ninth 
English edition that was updated to discuss Brasier). 
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[I]f the rape be charged to be committed on an infant 
under twelve years of age, she may still be a 
competent witness, if she hath sense and 
understanding to know the nature and obligations of 
an oath; and, even if she hath not, it is thought by Sir 
Matthew Hale that she ought to be heard without 
oath, to give the court information; though that alone 
will not be sufficient to convict the offender. And he 
is of this opinion, first, because the nature of the 
offence being secret, there may be no other possible 
proof of the actual fact; though afterwards there may 
be concurrent circumstances to corroborate it, proved 
by other witnesses: and, secondly, because the law 
allows what the child told her mother, or other 
relations, to be given in evidence, since the nature of 
the case admits frequently of no better proof; and 
there is much more reason for the court to hear the 
narration of the child herself, than to receive it at 
second hand from those who swear they heard her 
say so.60 
                                                          
60 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
214 (1st ed. 1769). The English first edition of volume four, which contained 
the quoted passage, was published in 1769. This passage remained in 
subsequent editions until the English ninth edition of volume four, published 
in 1783, which was updated to discuss Brasier. 1 MAXWELL & MAXWELL, 
supra note 46, at 27-28. This English 1783 ninth edition was the last to 
contain Blackstone’s alterations before he died. 
 The American first edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, published in 
Philadelphia in 1772, was the same as the first 1769 English edition of 
volume four, and contained the passage quoted. The next American edition 
was published in Worcester in 1790 and was the same as the 1783 English 
ninth edition, which contained Blackstone’s final alterations and revision 
discussing Brasier. ELDON REVARE JAMES, A LIST OF LEGAL TREATISES 
PRINTED IN THE BRITISH COLONIES AND THE AMERICAN STATES BEFORE 1801 
16-17 (Harvard Univ. Press 1934). 
 By most accounts, however, before the first American edition was ever 
published in 1772, over 1,000 copies of prior English editions were imported 
into the colonies. Randy J. Holland, Anglo-American Templars: Common 
Law Crusaders, 8 DEL. L. REV. 137, 148 (2006); accord Steve Sheppard, 
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Similarly, the various editions of Buller’s treatise, An 
Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius,61 cited 
Hale from the 1772 edition until it was updated in the 1790 
edition to discuss Brasier,62 for the possibility that courts might 
receive unsworn testimony from children: 
[I]t seems to be settled, that a Child under the Age of 
ten shall in no Case be admitted; but after that Age, 
                                                          
Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of 
Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547, 561 (1997) (“The 
Commentaries were an immediate success in America. Robert Bell, a 
Philadelphia printer, sold subscriptions for fifteen hundred copies throughout 
America, even though Americans had already bought more than one thousand 
copies of English editions . . . . For the next five decades, scores of 
annotated Commentaries poured forth.” (footnotes omitted)); Albert W. 
Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (“One 
thousand copies of the English edition of Blackstone were sold in the 
American Colonies before the first American edition appeared in 1772. This 
edition supplied another 1400 sets at a substantially lower price; and one year 
before the Declaration of Independence, Edmund Burke remarked in 
Parliament that nearly as many copies of the Commentaries had been sold on 
the American as on the English side of the Atlantic.” (footnotes omitted)).  
The Commentaries unquestionably influenced the Framers. See, e.g., 
Alschuler, supra at 2 (“[A]ll of our formative documents—the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and the seminal 
decisions of the Supreme Court under John Marshall—were drafted by 
attorneys steeped in [Blackstone’s Commentaries].” (citations omitted)); Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23 (1957) (“[T]wo of the greatest English jurists, 
Lord Chief Justice Hale and Sir William Blackstone  . . . exerted 
considerable influence on the Founders . . . .”). It is likely that at the time of 
the framing any number of editions were in use. For an example of the 
numerous and tangled history of the various editions, see generally The Law 
Library Microform Consortium at http://www.llmc.com/yale.htm#page_11 
(bibliography of Yale’s Blackstone Collection). 
61 This treatise was actually a revision of Henry Bathurst’s The Theory of 
Evidence (1761), which Bathurst later republished in expanded form in 1767 
in An Introduction to the Law Relative to Nisi Prius. Buller was Bathurst’s 
nephew and took over the treatise under his own name in 1772. There were 
multiple editions over the next several decades. See LANGBEIN, supra note 
15, at 212 n.150; T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA 
L. REV. 499, 531 n.238 (1999). 
62 See infra text accompanying note 129 (quoting 1790 edition that was 
updated to discuss Brasier). 
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if the Child appear to have any Notion of the 
Obligation of an Oath, after there has been a 
Foundation laid by other Witnesses to induce a 
Suspicion, the Child shall be admitted to prove the 
Fact. Doubtless the Court will more readily admit 
such a Child in the Case of a personal Injury (such as 
Rape) than on a Question between other Parties; and 
perhaps, in Such Case, would even admit the Infant 
to be examined without Oath [margin cite to Hale]; 
for certainly there is much more Reason for the Court 
to hear the Relation of the Child, than to receive it at 
second hand from those that heard it say so. In Cases 
of foul acts done in secret, where the Child is the 
Party injured, the repelling their Evidence entirely is, 
in some Measure, denying them the Protection of 
Law . . . .63 
Hale’s argument also made its way into criminal trials. In 
Omychund v. Barker64 in 1744 (first reported in 1765), for 
example, counsel cited Hale as support for the proposition that 
unsworn testimony can be received in evidence.65 The judges 
rejected the argument on the ground that Hale’s rule had not 
been followed in trials in London’s Old Bailey court.66 
The Old Bailey trials,67 however, reflect otherwise. In child 
                                                          
63 FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO 
TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 288-89 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall Printers 
to the King) (1772). 
64 1 Atk. 21 (K.B. 1744). The first three volumes of the Atkyns reporter 
were published in 1765. 1 MAXWELL & MAXWELL, supra note 46, at 344. 
65 Omychund, 1 Atk. at 29. 
66 Id. (“Lord Chief Justice Lee interrupted the Attorney General, and 
said, it was determined at the Old Bailey upon mature consideration, that a 
child should not be admitted as evidence without oath.  Lord Chief Baron 
Parker likewise said, it was so ruled at Kingston assizes before Lord 
Raymond, where upon an indictment for a rape he refused the evidence of a 
child without oath.”). The latter is a reference to the Travers case.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 46-52. 
67 “The Old Bailey was the London-area equivalent of the provincial 
assize court.” LANGBEIN, supra note 15, at 17.  The court had a heavy 
caseload: 
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rape prosecutions, the Old Bailey Session Papers68 report trials 
from 1678,69 1720,70 1762,71 1766,72 1768,73 and 176974 
                                                          
[T]he Old Bailey sat eight times a year whereas assizes sat twice 
a year. In the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the 
Old Bailey, which was the felony trial court for London and the 
surrounding county of Middlesex, processed between twelve and 
twenty jury trials per day through a single courtroom. 
Id. 
68 The Old Bailey Session Papers (“OBSP”) are pamphlet accounts of 
trials that were produced for the general public. LANGBEIN, supra note 15, at 
182-90. These reports varied in format and detail over time and have many 
limitations, including that they summarize the trials, reflect only a selection 
of cases, and focus primarily on the underlying facts, not the legal practices 
and procedures in place. See id.; accord Gallanis, supra note 61, at 553-54 
(“For the years before 1800, the OBSP are particularly useful . . . . In the 
nineteenth century, however, the OBSP tended increasingly to summarize the 
testimony presented at trial, rather than reproducing it in a more verbatim 
fashion.”). Professor Langbein has noted that rape cases often were reported 
with more detail in the OBSP, perhaps in the publishers’ efforts to cultivate a 
popular market. LANGBEIN, supra note 15, at 198. For a study of rape trials 
in the Old Bailey from 1730 to 1830, see Simpson, supra note 49, at 188. 
69 Rex v. Arrowsmith, OBSP (Dec. 11, 1678), available at 
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1670s/t16781211e-2.html. The child 
witnesses in Arrowsmith ultimately testified under oath, but the case reflects 
that the trial judge determined that receiving unsworn testimony was proper. 
Id. Specifically, the defendant was charged with rape of an eight-year-old. 
The victim and nine-year-old friend were initially heard unsworn. Id. The 
jury expressed concern that they were unsworn since the only other evidence 
was hearsay. Id. The court defended the admission of the unsworn testimony, 
telling the jury that “in regard to such Offenders never call other to be by 
while they commit such actions, they could expect no other Testimony from 
the Party injured, which they had, and with it an eye Witness, both whom 
they forbore to Swear, because of the tenderness of their Age; but if they 
insisted upon, they should be Sworn.” Id. The court had the children sworn 
and reexamined them, and the defendant was convicted of rape. Id. 
70 Rex v. Beesley, OBSP (Apr. 27, 1720), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1720s/t17200427-38.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of a ten-year-old girl. Id. The court asked the child if she 
understood the oath, and she did not. Id. Nevertheless, the court permitted 
her to testify, and she stated that the defendant had sexually assaulted her on 
two occasions. Id. The court also permitted hearsay evidence of a witness 
who testified “that the Girl told her the Prisoner had done the Wrong 
complained of.” Id. The defendant was acquitted. Id. 
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wherein the court permitted child victims of sexual abuse to 
testify unsworn. In Rex v. Stringer, for instance, the defendant 
was charged with rape of a seven-year-old girl.75 “The child was 
examined, but not upon oath, who said she carried a pot down 
into the cellar, the prisoner there took her and set her on a box 
and kissed her, and put his private parts to her’s, but did not put 
it into her.”76 The defendant was acquitted of the capital offense 
of rape, but re-indicted for the misdemeanor offense of assault 
with the intent to commit a rape.77 
                                                          
71 Rex v. Smith, OBSP (Apr. 21, 1762), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17620421-11.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of a five-year-old girl.  The “child [was] examined but not 
sworn” and testified that the defendant “said I must not tell my mamma.  He 
laid me down on my back and hurt my groin, and put his cock to me.” Id. 
The defendant was permitted to cross-examine the child and ultimately was 
acquitted of rape, but “detained to be tried at Hick’s-hall for an assault with 
an intent to commit a rape on the child.” Id. 
72 Rex v. Brophy, OBSP (Sept. 3, 1766), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17660903-38.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of a ten-year-old girl. At trial, a witness testified that, after 
originally denying anyone had assaulted her, the girl “said it was Ned.” Id. 
A doctor testified that “[s]he said the man had been concerned with her, 
mentioning the name Brophy; upon which I asked her where; she said in the 
cellar; she told me the day, but I do not recollect it.” Id. The defendant 
cross-examined the witnesses. The child testified, “not upon oath” about the 
rape.  The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to death. Id. 
73 Rex v. Stringer, OBSP (Apr. 13, 1768), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17680413-47.html. See infra text accompanying 
notes 75-76. 
74 Rex v. Gyles, OBSP (Apr. 5, 1769), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17690405-49.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of an eight-year-old girl. “The child was examined but not 
upon oath; the account she gave was short of proving the fact. Acquitted.” 
Id. 
75 Stringer, OBSP. 
76 Id. 
77 One review of child rape cases reported in the OBSP found that most 
of the cases resulted in acquittal. See Simpson, supra note 49, at 188 (finding 
82 percent acquittal rate in rape cases involving victims under ten years old). 
One explanation for the low conviction rate may be that conviction required 
proof of penetration. 1 HALE, supra note 53, at 628 (“To make a rape there 
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On the other hand, several other Old Bailey reports reflect 
that children often were not permitted to testify unsworn. In 
many of these trials, the children’s accounts were the only 
evidence, and defendants were acquitted.78 
                                                          
must be an actual penetration . . . .”). Some of the Old Bailey trials reflect 
concern over proof of penetration. See case cited infra note 81. Beyond the 
evidentiary difficulty of proving penetration, acquittal rates may be explained, 
in part, on “the sense that juries may have thought the capital sanction too 
hard . . . .” LANGBEIN, supra note 15, at 240 n.276. This view is consistent 
with a practice reflected in some OBSP cases, where the jury acquitted the 
defendant of rape, but the defendant was detained for another trial for assault 
with the intent to commit a rape, a non-capital misdemeanor offense. See 
cases cited supra and infra notes 71, 73, 78 (Foster), 82-88, 102. The 
practice of retrial on misdemeanor charges also suggests that while unsworn 
testimony of a child or hearsay statements by themselves were not considered 
sufficient to convict for a capital crime, they might have been considered 
sufficient for misdemeanor offenses. See cases cited infra notes 82 (issuing a 
sentence for the misdemeanor charges), 93 (finding the prisoner guilty of 
assault). 
78 E.g., Rex v. Linsey, OBSP (Sept. 12, 1750), available at 
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17500912-29.html (reporting 
case involving defendant charged with rape of a seven-year-old; “The child 
was not capable of being admitted to give its evidence upon oath, and there 
being no other evidence, the prisoner was acquitted.”); Rex v. White, OBSP 
(June 25, 1752), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/ 
1750s/t17520625-30.html (reporting case involving defendant charged with 
rape of an eleven-year-old; a doctor testified about the presence of a venereal 
disease, but the “child could not be examined upon oath, not knowing the 
nature of an oath. The prisoner was acquitted.”); Rex v. Foster, OBSP (Dec. 
12, 1764) available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/ 
t17641212-63.html (reporting case involving defendant charged with rape of a 
five-year-old; “The Surgeon that had inspected the child did not appear, nor 
any one else that had inspected her; and the child being too young to be 
examined, the prisoner was Acquitted. He was detained to be tried for an 
assault with intent to commit a Rape.”); Rex v. Crother, OBSP (Sept. 7, 
1774), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1770s/ 
t17740907-63.html (reporting case involving defendant charged with rape of a 
four-year-old; “The girl being too young to give her testimony upon oath, the 
prisoner who is but twelve years of age, was Acquitted.”); Rex v. Davies, 
OBSP (Sept. 11, 1776), available at http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ 
html_units/1770s/t17760911-71.html (reporting case involving defendant 
charged with rape of a six-year-old; “There was no evidence to prove the 
charge but the testimony of the child, who was not of sufficient age to be 
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In most of the child rape trials in the Old Bailey Session 
Papers, however, the court followed the practice, identified by 
Hale, of allowing hearsay of “incompetent” children to be 
admitted as evidence. Reports from trials in 1721,79 1724,80 
1735,81 1750,82 1751,83 1754,84 1757,85 1765,86 1768,87 and 
                                                          
examined under oath.  Not guilty.”). 
79 Rex v. Robbins, OBSP (Jan. 13, 1721), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1720s/t17210113-28.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of a seven-year-old girl. The child’s mother testified that 
the child said, “the Prisoner [had] put his finger into the place where she 
made Water, and also put the thing with which he made Water, into the Place 
where she made Water.” Id. The jury acquitted the defendant after hearing 
from several witnesses. Id. 
80 Rex v. Nichols, OBSP (Feb. 26, 1724), available at http://www.old-
bailey-online.org/html_units/1720s/t17240226-73.html. For a discussion of 
Nichols, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. 
81 Rex v. Gray, OBSP (Sept. 11, 1735), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1730s/t17350911-53.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of an eight-year-old girl. The child’s mother testified that 
upon examining the child’s genitals, which showed symptoms of venereal 
disease, the child “fell on her Knees, and said that one Gray did it.” Id. 
After hearing testimony from doctors concerning the lack of evidence of 
penetration, the jury acquitted the defendant. Id. 
82 Rex v. Tankling, OBSP (July 11, 1750), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17500711-25.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of a girl under four years old. A doctor testified that: 
I examined the child and the prisoner, they were both foul. The 
child said, the prisoner hurt her very much with his cock . . . . 
. . . .  
The infant not being capable of giving evidence, the prisoner 
was acquitted; and by order of the court there was another 
indictment preferred against him at Hicks’s-hall for an intent to 
commit rape, and giving the child the foul disease.  The 
prisoner was there cast to be confined in the prison of Newgate 
[for] three years . . . . 
Id. 
83 Rex v. Larkin, OBSP (July 3, 1751), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17510703-21.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of a ten-year-old girl. A neighbor testified that the child 
“said, he was very impudent,” and another woman who lived with the 
neighbor “went on and confirmed her account.” Id. The child “was not 
admitted to be sworn,” and the defendant acquitted, but indicted for a 
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177188 reflect that child victims’ family members, doctors, 
neighbors, or others were allowed to testify about what children 
had told them. In 1724, for instance, the defendant in Rex v. 
Nichols89 was on trial for the rape of a five-year-old girl.90 The 
                                                          
misdemeanor. Id. 
84 Rex v. Kirk, OBSP (May 30, 1754), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17540530-36.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of a girl under seven years old. “[T]he child being so 
young and not knowing the nature of an oath, could not be examined.” Id. 
The child’s mother, however, testified that “[t]he child told me he used to put 
his hands up her petticoats,” and another woman testified that “[t]he child 
told me he had done it to her as mentioned by the last evidence.” Id. The 
court ultimately concluded that “[t]here being no other evidence against the 
prisoner than hearsay from the child’s mouth it was not judged sufficient; he 
was therefore acquitted, but detained to be tried on another indictment at 
Hick’s-Hall for an assault with an intent to commit a rape.” Id. 
85 Rex v. Crosby, OBSP (Dec. 7, 1757), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17571207-14.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of a ten-year-old girl. The child’s mother testified that the 
child said, “Mr. Crosby did it, the day his wife went to the hospital, and left 
me there; he got into bed and call[ed] me to him. I went to him.  Then he 
pulled me to him, and put his c-k in me there, and hurt me sadly.” Id. The 
court noted that “the child being but nine years and three quarters old, and 
not being examined upon oath, he was acquitted; but detained to be tried next 
session for an assault upon the child with an intent to commit a rape.” Id. 
86 Rex v. Tibbel, OBSP (Oct. 16, 1765), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17651016-2.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of a four-year-old girl. The child’s mother testified that “I 
asked her who had hurt her? She said, Sam had hurt her, that is the 
prisoner . . . .” Id. Other witnesses testified that the defendant had confessed 
to raping the child. The jury acquitted the defendant, but he was detained to 
be tried for assault with intent to commit a rape. Id. 
87 Rex v. Allam, OBSP (Sept. 7, 1768) available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1760s/t17680907-40.html. The defendant was 
charged with rape of an eight-year-old girl.  The child’s mother testified that 
“the child then said, William Allam had had to do with her in the shed two 
days before . . . .” Id. The defendant was acquitted, but detained to be tried 
for assault with intent to commit a rape. Id. 
88 Rex v. Craige, OBSP (July 3, 1771), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1770s/t17710703-33.html. For a discussion of 
Craige, see infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
89 Rex v. Nichols, OBSP (Feb. 26, 1724), available at http://www.old-
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child did not appear, but her mother testified that the child “told 
her the Prisoner had made her kneel upon his knees had taken 
up her coats, and had hurt her sadly.”91 A doctor was permitted 
to testify “that the child did say it had been done to her by the 
Prisoner.”92 The court reportedly found that “[t]he child being 
too young to swear to the fact, the jury acquitted him of the 
rape, but found him guilty of the assault.”93 Nearly fifty years 
later, in Rex v. Craige,94 a defendant was on trial for the rape of 
a girl who was under ten years old. The girl’s neighbor testified, 
she said “I will tell you who it was if you won’t tell my dada; I 
said I would not, but would tell her mama. She said it was Mr. 
Craige.”95 
Further reflecting the inconsistent application of law during 
this period, a few Old Bailey reports show that hearsay of child 
victims was deemed inadmissible. In 1754,96 during the trial of 
the defendant for rape of a nine-year-old girl, the child’s mother 
started to testify that she tried to get the child to explain what 
had happened to her, but the court intervened, stating “[y]ou 
must not tell what the girl said, that is not evidence.”97 
Beyond these reports of actual trials, the issue concerning 
allowing unsworn testimony was reflected in the 1770 edition of 
an influential English justice of the peace manual. This manual 
cited Travers and Omychund for the proposition that unsworn 
testimony of children could not be admitted “as evidence,” but 
cited Hale in support of allowing unsworn testimony to provide 
information to the court “where the exigence of the case 






94 OBSP (July 3, 1771), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1770s/t17710703-33.html. 
95 Id. The defendant ultimately was acquitted of rape but detained for 
trial for assault with intent to ravish a different child. 
96 Rex v. Grimes, OBSP (May 30, 1754), available at http://www.old-
baileyonline.org/html_units/1750s/t17540530-1.html. 
97 Id. 
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requires it . . . especially in cases of rape, buggery, and such 
crimes as are practiced upon children.”98 
                                                          
98 1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 
487 (11th ed. 1770). The first edition in 1755 simply cited Hale in support of 
allowing unsworn testimony: 
But if an infant be of age of 14 years, he is as to this purpose, 
of the age of discretion, to be sworn as a witness; but if under 
that age, yet if it appear, that he hath a competent discretion, he 
may be sworn. 2 H.H. 278. 
And in many cases an infant of tender years may be examined 
without oath, where the exigence of the case requires it; which 
possibly, being fortified with concurrent evidences, may be of 
some weight; especially in cases of rape, buggery, and such 
crimes as are practiced upon children. 2 H.H. 279, 284. 
1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 190 (1st 
ed. 1755); cf. 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 279 (“But in many cases an infant 
of tender years may be examined without oath, where the exigence of the 
case requires it, as in case of rape, buggery, witchcraft . . . .”). By the 
eighth edition in 1764, the quote remained the same, but a citation to the 
Travers case, which was first published in 1755, was added. 1 RICHARD 
BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 342 (8th ed. 1764) 
(“especially in cases of rape, buggery, and such crimes as are practiced upon 
children. 2 H.H. 279, 284.  Str. 700.”); see also supra notes 46-52 and 
accompanying text (discussing Travers). 
 The 1766 tenth edition was updated to incorporate the Travers and 
Omychund decisions. The following shows how the 1766 edition was updated 
from the prior editions: 
But if an infant be of age of 14 years, he is as to this purpose of 
the age of discretion, to be sworn as a witness; but if under that 
age, yet if it appear, that he hath a competent discretion, he may 
be sworn. 2 H.H. 278. 
And in many cases an infant of tender years may be examined 
without oath, where the exigence of the case requires it; which 
possibly, being fortified with concurrent evidences, may be of 
some weight; especially in cases of rape, buggery, and such 
crimes as are practiced upon children. 2 H.H. 279, 284. Str. 
700. 
But in no case shall an infant be admitted as evidence, without 
oath.  Str. 700 [Travers], Tracy Atk. 29 [Omychund]. 
The changes reflected in the 1766 tenth edition are not entirely clear given 
that the deletion of the words “without oath” may suggest that no unsworn 
testimony could be received. More likely, the 1766 manual is attempting to 
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By 1775, the issue was coming to a head. In King v. 
Powell,99 the defendant was tried for rape of a six-year-old. 
Since the child was presumed by law incompetent, “she was 
admitted to give her evidence against the prisoner without being 
sworn,”100 but the defendant was acquitted nonetheless. Judge 
Gould “mentioned the case to the [Twelve] Judges; and the 
majority of them were of opinion, that in criminal cases no 
                                                          
reconcile Hale’s views with Travers and Omychund and drawing a distinction 
between admitting unsworn testimony as “evidence” rather than as 
“information” that would be insufficient to secure a conviction. 
 American justice of the peace manuals were based on Burn’s manual and 
many were copied verbatim from Burn’s 1770 (or later) editions’ discussion 
of unsworn testimony. See JOSEPH GREENLEAF, AN ABRIDGMENT OF BURN’S 
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 124 (Boston 1773); RICHARD 
STARKE, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 144 (Virginia 
1774); JOHN GRIMKE, THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 192 (1788); 
ELIPHALET LADD, BURN’S ABRIDGEMENT OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 143 
(1792); WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 177-78 
(1795). At least a few manuals, however, were copied verbatim from earlier 
editions and contain a discussion of unsworn testimony identical to the 1755 
edition of Burn’s manual quoted above. JAMES PARKER, CONDUCTOR 
GENERALIS 167 (Woodbridge, N.J. 1764); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 170 (New 
York 1788, printed by John Patterson for Robert Hodge); THE CONDUCTOR 
GENERALIS 140 (New York, 1788, printed by Hugh Gaine). I am indebted to 
Professor Davies for alerting me to these sources. 
99 168 Eng. Rep. 157, 1 Leach 110 (K.B. 1775). 
100 Id. at 157, 1 Leach at 110. A reporter’s annotation in Powell 
provides: 
(a) Lord Hale, vol i. page 634 says, That if an infant appear 
unfit to be sworn, the Court ought to hear her information 
without oath; but he admits that such evidence is not of itself 
sufficient testimony to convict, because it was not upon oath. In 
the argument in Omychund v. Barker, Mich Term 1744, it was 
said by L.C. J. Lee, that it was determined at the Old Bailey, 
upon mature consideration, that a child cannot be admitted as a 
witness except upon oath; and L.C.B. Parker likewise said, that 
it was so ruled at Kingston Assizes before Lord Raymond 
[Travers], where, upon and indictment for a rape, he refused the 
evidence of a child without oath, 1 Atkins, 21. See also the case 
of The King v. Steward, 1 Strange, 701, and The King v. 
Brasier, post, Summer Assize, Reading, 1778. 
Id. at 158, 1 Leach at 111. 
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testimony can be received except upon oath.”101 Thus, by 1775, 
a split court of the Twelve Judges suggested in essentially dicta 
(since the defendant in Powell was acquitted)102 that an 
                                                          
101 Id. at 158, 1 Leach at 110. 
102 Like Brasier, however, the version of Powell in the first edition of 
Leach’s Crown Cases differed from the version in the English Reports. The 
first version reported that the defendant was convicted.  See Davies, Not the 
Framers’ Design, supra note 26, at 446 n.238. In 1793, a much more 
detailed account of defendant Powell’s trial appeared in a reporter that 
collected reports of trials involving “adultery, incest, imbecility, ravishment.” 
See 2 CUCKOLD’S CHRONICLE 440-46 (1793). This report indicates that the 
trial judge in Powell recognized a longstanding dispute over whether to allow 
unsworn testimony, but allowed the child to testify unsworn so that the issue 
could finally be resolved by the Twelve Judges if the defendant was 
convicted. The judge reportedly quoted the section of Hale’s treatise 
advocating the admission of unsworn testimony and noted a conflict with the 
Travers case which had precluded the admission of such testimony. The judge 
noted, however, that Travers was decided before Hale’s treatise was 
published. Id. at 441. The court also reportedly decided not to be bound by 
Travers since he was aware of a dispute among the Twelve Judges 
concerning the admission of unsworn testimony: 
I should have thought myself bound by that case [Travers], if I 
had not known the question much doubted of, and debated 
among the [Twelve] Judges: some hold it one way, and some 
another.  I do think it is a point that ought to be considered and 
settled.  I am at present inclined to follow the opinion of the 
King and Travers, but am aware that case is not approved by all 
the Judges; and therefore, in so very important a question of 
this, I think, in point of prudence, it should be settled; for we 
have too many instance of offenses of this kind. 
Id. at 442. The judge reportedly also addressed Hale’s view about child 
hearsay: 
With regard to admitting the declaration of the child to the 
mother, Lord Hale speaks of that as a clear and settled thing; 
for, he says, if you hear the child at second hand, she should be 
heard also at first hand . . . . I am of the present of opinion, not 
only to hear the evidence of the woman [the child’s mother], but 
likewise to examine the child without oath: and, if the matter 
rests upon that, make a case for the opinion of the Judges. 
Id at 442. The judge allowed the child’s mother to testify about what the 
child had told her and also permitted the six-year-old child to testify 
unsworn. Id. at 442-43, 445. “The Jury, however, brought him in Not 
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incompetent child should not be permitted to testify unsworn. 
Four years later, the Twelve Judges decided Brasier. 
2.  Brasier Read in Context 
In 1779, the Twelve Judges considered Brasier, another case 
involving a young child who was presumed incompetent under 
the rule followed in the Travers case. Read divorced from the 
child competency issues of the time, Brasier appears to address 
only two issues. First, the case appears to address the age at 
which a child may be sworn. The Twelve Judges rejected the 
rule in Travers and held, “there is no precise or fixed rule as to 
the time within which infants are excluded from giving 
evidence.”103 Second, the Brasier case appears to address a 
hearsay question, where the court held that “no testimony 
whatever can be legally received except upon oath” and then 
stated that the trial judge should have excluded the testimony of 
the mother and lodger.104 
Considered in the context of Sir Matthew Hale’s argument 
that children should be permitted to testify unsworn, the pre-
Brasier Blackstone and Buller commentary, the inconsistent 
treatment of unsworn statements in the Old Bailey trials, and 
Powell’s recognition of division on the issue, Brasier also should 
be interpreted as resolving the prevailing issue about unsworn 
testimony. This is important because it reflects that the statement 
“no testimony whatever can be legally received except upon 
oath”—which many have assumed characterized the hearsay as 
“testimony” and therefore relevant under Crawford’s 
                                                          
Guilty. Another indictment was found against him, for violently assaulting 
and abusing the said Margaret Edson; of which he was found guilty at the 
next Assizes.” Id. at 446. Thus, this more detailed report suggests the later 
edition of Leach’s containing Powell correctly reported that the defendant was 
acquitted. The earlier report may have improperly suggested a conviction 
based on the re-indictment and retrial for the misdemeanor offense, a practice 
not uncommon in sexual abuse cases during the time. See discussion supra 
note 77. 
103 King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 203, 1 Leach 199, 200 (K.B. 
1779). 
104 Id. at 202, 1 Leach at 200. 
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testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy—was simply referring to 
the ability of young Mary Harris or any other incompetent child 
to testify unsworn. The Twelve Judges were stating that no one 
can give testimony if not sworn, not that the hearsay was 
“testimony.” 
The Brasier report itself confirms as much by including in 
the reporter’s annotations citations to the relevant pages in 
Hale’s treatise,105 the Omychund case,106 the Travers case,107 and 
other sources108 that addressed whether children could testify 
                                                          
105 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
106 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. 
108 The reporter notes in Brasier cite to several sources: 
The prisoner was convicted; but the judgment was respited, on a 
doubt, created by a marginal note to a case in Dyer’s Reports 
(Dyer, 303, b, in marg; 1 Hale, 302, 634; 2 Hale, 279; 11 
Mod. 228; 1 Atkins, 29; Foster, 70; 2 Hawk. 612; Gilb. L. E. 
144); for these notes having been made by Lord Chief-Justice 
Treby, are considered of great weight and authority; and it was 
submitted to the Twelve Judges, Whether this evidence was 
sufficient in point of law? 
168 Eng. Rep. at 202, 1 Leach at 200. 
 The citations to Hale reference the pages involving the age at which a 
child can be sworn and Hale’s argument that a child should be permitted to 
testify unsworn. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (quoting 1 
Hale 634 and 2 Hale 279). The cite to “11 Mod, 228” is Young v. 
Slaughterford, which involved a question concerning the age at which a child 
could be sworn. The cite to “1 Atkins, 29,” is the Omychund case, in which 
the court addressed Hale’s argument about children being unsworn. See supra 
text accompanying notes 64-66 (discussing Omychund).  The cite to “Foster, 
70” is reference to The Case of William York, involving a prosecution of a 
ten-year-old for the murder of a five-year-old. The relation to Brasier is 
unclear, though perhaps because the boy confessed and declarations 
containing hearsay of his confessions were admitted, it related to the ability 
of a court to hear unsworn testimony. Next are references to Hawkins and 
Gilbert’s treatises, which discuss the age at which a child may be sworn. 
Finally, the marginal note was based on a note in Dyer’s Report at 303b. 
That page of Dyer’s I located (likely a different edition) contains no relevant 
discussion. But the next page contains a reference to a child rape case that 
“[a] man of sixty years old who had a wife, was arraigned at Newgate . . . 
for the rape of a girl then of the age of seven years, and no more; and was 
FRANZE 6/22/2007 1:09 AM 
 CONFRONTATION AND ORIGINALISM 527 
unsworn. 
More importantly, it is possible (albeit questionable) that the 
child in Brasier did, in fact, testify unsworn. To be sure, the 
report of Brasier in the English Reports that was discussed by 
the Supreme Court and litigants in Davis states that Mary Harris 
“was not sworn or produced as a witness on the trial.”109 In the 
course of my discussions about Brasier with Professor Thomas 
Davies, however, he identified an earlier report of Brasier that 
appeared in the 1789 first edition of Leach’s Crown Cases. This 
original report says nothing about the mother and the lodger 
providing out-of-court statements of Mary Harris, but instead 
indicates that the child testified unsworn: 
This was a case reserved for the opinion of the 
Twelve Judges, by Mr. Justice Gould, at the Summer 
Assizes for York in the year ___, [blank in original] 
on the trial of an indictment for a rape on the body of 
an infant under seven years of age. The information 
of the infant was received in evidence against the 
prisoner; but as she had not attained the years of 
presumed discretion, and did not appear to possess 
sufficient understanding to be aware of the dangers of 
perjury, she was not sworn. 
The prisoner was convicted; but the judgment was 
respited, on a doubt, Whether evidence, under any 
circumstances whatever, could be legally admitted in 
a criminal prosecution except upon oath? 
The Judges were unanimously of opinion, That no 
testimony whatever can be legally received except 
upon oath; and that an infant, though under the age of 
                                                          
found guilty by apparent evidence of divers women and a surgeon, and the 
girl herself; and hanged by the neck.” 3 Dyer 304a n.51. Since the child was 
under nine, presumably she was incompetent as a matter of law, but 
permitted to testify unsworn. In one of the reports concerning Powell’s case, 
which reported that the Twelve Judges were split on whether a child could 
testify unsworn, the trial judge reportedly noted a case reported at page 304 
of Dyer in its analysis of the on-going debate about unsworn testimony of 
children. See CUCKOLD’S CHRONICLE, supra note 102, at 441. 
109 Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202, 1 Leach at 200. 
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seven years, may be sworn in a criminal prosecution, 
provided such infant appears, on strict examination by 
the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the 
nature and consequences of an oath: for there is no 
precise or fixed rule as to the time within which 
infants are excluded from giving evidence; but their 
admissibility depends upon the sense and reason they 
entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood, 
which is to be collected from their answers to 
questions propounded to them by the Court; but if 
they are found incompetent, their testimony cannot be 
received.110 
Upon further research, I located two other Leach’s reports of 
the case from 1792 and 1800, respectively. These versions 
differed slightly from the 1789 report, but similarly state that 
Mary Harris testified at trial.111 
                                                          
110 Id. (emphasis added). There were four editions of Leach’s Cases in 
Crown Law: the first edition (1730-1789), second edition (1730-1791), the 
third edition (1730-1800), and the fourth edition (1730-1815). 1 MAXWELL & 
MAXWELL, supra note 46, at 303. The English Reports reprinted only the 
fourth edition of Leach’s likely because it was viewed as the most accurate. 
ROY M. MERSKY AND DONALD J. DUNN, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL 
RESEARCH 512 (8th ed. 2002) (“English Reports . . . . This is a reprint of 
the nominate reports from 1220 to 1865. When there were competing sets of 
reports, the editors included only the set they deemed most accurate.”); see 
also JOHN WILLIAM WALLACE, THE COMMON LAW REPORTERS 430 (Soule 
and Bugbee eds. 1882) (describing Leach’s: “There are editions in 1789, 
1792, 1800, and perhaps other years; the best and most complete is in 2 vols. 
8vo, 1815.”). 
111 The following shows how the 1792 report in Leach’s was updated 
from the 1789 report: 
This was a case reserved for the opinion of the Twelve Judges, 
by Mr. Justice Gould, at the Summer Assizes for York in the 
year 1778, on the trial of an indictment for a rape on the body 
of an infant under seven years of age.  The information of the 
infant was received in evidence against the prisoner; but as she 
had not attained the years of presumed discretion, and did not 
appear to possess sufficient understanding to be aware of the 
dangers of perjury, she was not sworn. 
The prisoner was convicted; but the judgment was respited, on a 
FRANZE 6/22/2007 1:09 AM 
 CONFRONTATION AND ORIGINALISM 529 
                                                          
doubt, Whether evidence, under any circumstances whatever, 
could be legally admitted in a criminal prosecution except upon 
oath? 
The Judges assembled at Serjeants-Inn Hall 12, April 1779, 
were unanimously of opinion, That no testimony whatever can 
be legally received except upon oath; and that an infant, though 
under the age of seven years, may be sworn in a criminal 
prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict examination 
by the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the nature and 
consequences of an oath: for there is no precise or fixed rule as 
to the time within which infants are excluded from giving 
evidence; but their admissibility depends upon the sense and 
reason they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood, 
which is to be collected from their answers to questions 
propounded to them by the Court; but if they are found 
incompetent to take an oath, their testimony cannot be received. 
They determined, therefore, that the information of the infant, 
which had been given in evidence in the present case, ought not 
to have been received. 
King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 182-83 (K.B. rev. ed. 1792). The following shows 
how the 1800 report was updated from the 1792 report. 
This was a case reserved for the opinion of the Twelve Judges, 
by Mr. Justice Buller Gould, at the Summer Assizes for Reading 
York in the year 1778, on the trial of an indictment for a rape 
on the body of an infant under seven years of age. 
The information information of the infant was received in 
evidence against the prisoner; but as she had not attained the 
years of presumed discretion, and did not appear to possess 
sufficient understanding to be aware of the dangers of perjury, 
she was not sworn. [reporter’s footnote] 
The prisoner was convicted; but the judgment was respited, on a 
doubt, created by a marginal note to a case in Dyer’s Reports; 
for these notes having been made by Lord Chief Justice Treby, 
are considered of great weight and authority; and it was 
submitted to the Twelve Judges,Whether evidence, under any 
circumstances whatever, could be legally admitted in a criminal 
prosecution except upon oath? 
The Judges assembled at Sergeants-Inn Hall 12, April 1779, 
were unanimously of opinion, That no testimony whatever can 
be legally received except upon oath; and that an infant, though 
under the age of seven years, may be sworn in a criminal 
prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict examination 
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In total, there is the original report in the 1789 edition of 
Leach’s,112 slightly different versions in the 1792 and 1800 
editions of Leach’s,113 and a fourth version in the 1815 edition 
of Leach’s. This last version from 1815 was reprinted in the 
English Reports and typically is cited today as the Brasier case. 
Again, these reports reflect material changes over time. In the 
1789 and 1792 reports, the child testified unsworn and Leach’s 
made no mention of the mother, lodger, or any hearsay. The 
1800 report changed the trial court and judge. More important, 
while the body of the report remained similar to the prior 1789 
and 1792 reports and stated that the child testified unsworn, a 
footnote was added indicating that additional information about 
the case was located in manuscript notes:114 “It appears by a 
                                                          
by the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the nature and 
consequences of an oath [reporter’s footnote]: for there is no 
precise or fixed rule as to the time within which infants are 
excluded from giving evidence; but their admissibility depends 
upon the sense and reason they entertain of the danger and 
impiety of falsehood, which is to be collected from their answers 
to questions propounded to them by the Court; but if they are 
found incompetent to take an oath, their testimony cannot be 
received.  They determined, therefore, that the information of 
the infant, which had been given in evidence in the present case, 
ought not to have been received. 
[first footnote]: It appears by a manuscript note of this case, in 
the possession of a gentleman at the bar, that the child’s 
evidence was not received at all; but that the mother and another 
witness gave evidence of what the child had said at the time. 
[second footnote]: See White’s Case, post. 
Brasier, 1 Leach 237 (K.B. rev. ed. 1800). 
112 Brasier, 1 Leach 346 (K.B. 1789 ed.). 
113 Brasier, 1 Leach 182-83 (K.B. rev. ed. 1792); Brasier, 1 Leach 237 
(K.B. rev. ed. 1800). 
114 For a discussion of how manuscript notes kept by lawyers, judges, or 
others may differ from case reports, see generally James Oldham, Detecting 
Non-Fiction: Sleuthing Among Manuscript Case Reports for What was Really 
Said in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN (1995) (noting discrepancies between 
printed reports and manuscript notes kept by judges, lawyers, and others and 
analyzing five cases to show how manuscripts can alter the understanding of 
printed case reports). 
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manuscript note of this case, in the possession of a gentleman at 
the bar, that the child’s evidence was not received at all; but that 
the mother and another witness gave evidence of what the child 
had said at the time.”115 Finally, the 1815 report stated in the 
body of the report both that Mary Harris did not testify and that 
hearsay of the mother and lodger was received at trial. 
These multiple versions and changes over time are important 
from an original meaning context because, assuming the 
Framers even referred to the law of child competency when 
considering confrontation rights, the only Leach’s reports of 
Brasier in print at the framing in 1789 and ratification in 1791 
did not mention hearsay. Nor did the Leach’s reports in print the 
year after ratification in 1792.116 Simply put, before, during, and 
immediately after 1791, the Framers likely would have 
understood Brasier as concerning only child competency and not 
the admission of out-of-court statements. 
What about the hearsay testimony of the mother and the 
lodger? Again, the reports of the case in Leach’s until 1800 
made no mention of hearsay. I did locate, however, some post-
Brasier/pre-ratification English sources that suggest generally, 
with no mention of the mother and lodger, that Brasier involved 
hearsay. The 1783 English edition Commentaries of William 
Blackstone (one of the Twelve Judges who considered Brasier), 
for instance, provided: “[I]t is now settled [Brazier’s case, 
before the twelve judges, P. 19 Geo. III] that no hearsay 
evidence can be given of the declarations of a child who hath 
not capacity to be sworn, nor can such child be examined in 
court without oath . . . .”117 But Blackstone’s discussion of 
Brasier does not appear to have been widely considered even in 
                                                          
115 Brasier, 1 Leach 237 (K.B. rev. ed. 1800). 
116 Some framing-era reports of Brasier suggest an understanding that 
Mary Harris testified, but even some of those reports reflect an inconsistent 
understanding of the case. An annotation accompanying the Travers case, for 
instance, suggests that Mary Harris was sworn: “Brazier’s case, where an 
infant of 5 years old was held a good witness by all the Judges, she appearing 
to be acquainted with the nature of the obligation of the oath.” Rex v. 
Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. 793, 794, 2 Strange 700, 701 (K.B. 1726). 
117 See Blackstone, supra note 60 (1783 English edition). 
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England before 1791. For example, Burn’s 1785 justice of the 
peace manual appears to reference Brasier (not by name), but 
made no mention of hearsay.118 Similarly, Barry’s English 
justice of the peace manual from 1790 discusses Brasier, 
indicates that Mary Harris testified at trial unsworn, and does 
not mention hearsay.119 After 1791, however, the 1793 update of 
Burn’s justice of the peace manual summarizes Blackstone’s 
discussion of Brasier and hearsay, but it is questionable whether 
that or any post-1785 version of Burns would have been 
available in the states.120 Further, a 1793 English treatise also 
                                                          
118 4 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 69 (15th ed. 1785). 
Burn’s manual notes Hale’s argument for allowing unsworn testimony and 
Hale’s rationale that “the law allows what the child told her mother or other 
relations to be given in evidence . . .  and there is much more reason for the 
court to hear the narration of the child herself, than to receive it second hand 
from those who swear they heard her say so.” Id. (citation omitted). The 
manual discusses Blackstone’s view on the age of incompetency (from the 
edition of Blackstone before Brasier was added) and makes what likely is a 
reference to Brasier: “But after all, it is said to have been determined lately 
by all the judges upon conference, that in no case shall the testimony of an 
infant be admitted without oath.” Id. at 71. Later editions replace this 
reference with a more detailed account of Brasier.  See discussion infra note 
120. 
119 3 EDWARD BARRY, THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF A JUSTICE OF THE 
PEACE 521 (1790). Barry’s description appears to be based in part on Richard 
Burn’s 1785 (15th edition) manual, though it adds a more detailed discussion 
of Brasier. See discussion supra note 118. I was unable to locate a copy of 
the 16th edition of Burn’s published in 1788, which may include the same 
text as Barry. 
120 The 1793 update to Burn’s justice of the peace manual, supra note 
118, deleted the following passage from a prior edition which appeared to 
reference Brasier: “But after all, it is said to have been determined lately by 
all the judges upon conference, that in no case shall the testimony of an 
infant be admitted without oath.” The 1793 edition replaced this passage with 
the following, which cited to Blackstone as the source: “Finally, It is now 
settled by all the twelve judges upon conference, in Brazier’s case, E. 19. G. 
3, that no hearsay evidence can be given of the declarations of a child who 
hath not capacity to be sworn, nor can such child be examined in court 
without oath . . . .” JOHN BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (18th ed. 1793) 
(revised edition of works of Richard Burns, his father). 
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discussed Brasier but made no mention of hearsay.121 All of this 
suggests that Brasier was not widely considered as involving 
hearsay in England before or shortly after 1791. 
Even assuming Blackstone’s short reference to Brasier was a 
reliable indicator of framing-era understanding in England 
before ratification, however, it does not show that child hearsay 
was considered “testimonial.” Blackstone merely recognized, 
without any discussion of the facts in the case, that (1) a child 
could not testify unsworn; and (2) no hearsay of an unsworn 
child could be received in evidence. Blackstone did not say 
hearsay is “testimony.” Also, the principal rationale for 
excluding unsworn testimony, or second-hand accounts of 
unsworn hearsay, was a concern that an incompetent child may 
not understand right from wrong.122 That says nothing about 
cross-examination and is more akin to a reliability concern, a 
consideration the Crawford court rejected in confrontation 
analysis.123 
In sum, the law in England before Brasier allowed out-of-
court statements of children to be admitted into evidence and 
that law was the predicate for an ongoing debate over child 
competency issues, including the age at which children should 
be sworn and whether children should be permitted to testify 
unsworn. Brasier was understood in England as resolving the 
                                                          
121 A 1793 treatise I located simply reported the 1789 Leach’s version of 
Brasier (which makes no mention of the mother and lodger) as addressing the 
age at which a child could be sworn and prohibition on unsworn testimony. 
PETER LOVELASS, THE TRADER’S SAFEGUARD: A FULL, CLEAR, AND 
FAMILIAR EXPLANATION OF THE LAW  276 (1793). As for Blackstone, it is 
questionable whether Blackstone’s reference to Brasier and hearsay would 
have influenced the Framers, since most of the editions of Blackstone in the 
states did not contain it and it is doubtful the other sources discussing 
Blackstone would have been widely available, or available at all in the states 
before 1791. See discussion supra note 60 (discussing use of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries in the colonies). 
122 See Rex v. Travers, 93 Eng. Rep. 793, 2 Strange 700 (K.B. 1726) 
(“The reason why the law prohibits the evidence of a child so young is, 
because the child cannot be presumed to distinguish betwixt right and 
wrong”); see also supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. 
123 See discussion supra note 5. 
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age of capacity and unsworn testimony issue. As for the issue 
concerning out-of-court statements, there does not appear to be a 
general understanding in England in 1791 that Brasier changed 
the rule concerning whether hearsay was admissible, in large 
part because most reports of the case of the time do not even 
mention hearsay. To the extent the hearsay in Brasier was 
known at the time, moreover, none of the analysis focused on 
confrontation, hearsay, or cross-examination. Indeed, if the child 
in Brasier did in fact testify unsworn, as the 1789 and 1792 
reports in Leach’s suggest, there likely would be no 
confrontation issue at all. When a witness appears, testifies, and 
the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine, the only 
constraint is hearsay principles, not the Confrontation Clause.124 
D.  How Brasier was Understood In the Years After It Was 
Decided 
In Crawford, the majority looked not only to the law leading 
up to ratification to determine the original meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause, but also “[e]arly state decisions [that] 
shed light upon the original understanding of the common-law 
right” as well as nineteenth century treatises.125 Conducting a 
post-ratification analysis of how Brasier was understood in 
England or the states reveals that much depends on which report 
of the case was being reviewed. Further complicating matters, 
one of the most often cited reports of Brasier was not the 1789, 
1792, 1800, or 1815 reports in Leach’s or the short reference in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, but rather, a report of the case that 
appeared in a popular treatise from 1803. 
1.  Brasier and Child Competency Issues 
Regardless of the report of Brasier at issue, both before and 
                                                          
124 E.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“[W]e 
reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior 
testimonial statements”). 
125 Id. at 49. 
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after 1791 the case principally was understood in England and 
the states as resolving child competency issues. Two of the first 
treatise references to Brasier discussed the case in terms of child 
competency. As noted, in 1783 Blackstone, one of the Twelve 
Judges who considered Brasier, referenced the case as resolving 
issues concerning the age at which a child could be sworn, 
rejecting Hale’s view that children should be permitted to testify 
unsworn, and precluding the admission of hearsay of an 
incompetent child.126 Blackstone, however, did not mention the 
mother or the lodger and did not expressly state whether Mary 
Harris had been permitted to testify unsworn.127 Likewise, Sir 
Francis Buller’s treatise was revised in 1790 to incorporate 
Brasier into its discussion of child competency issues.128 Citing 
the 1789 Leach’s report of Brasier, Buller describes the case as 
holding, “that a child of any age if she were capable of 
distinguishing between good and evil might be examined on 
oath, and consequently, that evidence of what she had said ought 
not to be received.”129 This description is notable not only 
because it makes no mention of the mother or lodger and any 
hearsay, but also because Buller (according to the 1800 and 
1815 reports) was the trial judge in Brasier who referred the 
case to the Twelve Judges (which also included Buller) for 
review. 
Early state cases similarly cited Brasier for child competency 
issues. Courts cited the case to support no presumptive limit on 
the age at which a child could be sworn,130 a result ultimately 
                                                          
126 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (quoting earlier edition of 
Buller treatise). 
129 FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO 
TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS 293 (London, A. Strahan & M. Woodfall Law Printers 
to the King, corrected 5th ed. 1790). 
130 E.g., State v. True Whittier, 21 Me. 341, 347 (1842) (“It was at one 
time considered, that an infant, under the age of nine years could not be 
permitted to testify. Rex v. Travers, Stra. 700. And that between the ages of 
nine and fourteen years it was within the discretion of the Court to admit or 
not, as it should or should not be satisfied of the infant’s understanding and 
moral sense. It was finally determined in Brazier’s case, [citing East’s 1803 
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followed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1895 when it adopted 
Brasier and upheld a trial court’s decision finding a five-year-old 
competent to testify in a murder case.131 Courts also cited 
Brasier as resolving the issue about whether children could 
testify unsworn, such as in an 1814 Delaware case, which 
contrasted Hale’s view on allowing a child to testify unsworn 
with Brasier.132 Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court in 1841, 
citing the 1789 Leach’s report of Brasier noted that, “In Lord 
Hale’s time, it was common to examine children of tender 
years, without swearing them. This practice was overturned in 
1779, in Brazier’s case, when the judges were unanimously of 
the opinion that no testimony whatever, could be legally 
                                                          
report], on consideration between all the judges that a child of any age, 
capable of distinguishing between good and evil, might be examined under 
oath.” (citations omitted)); Day v. Day, 56 N.H. 316 (1876) (citing 1800 
Leach’s report of Brasier and East’s 1803 report for proposition that children 
under age nine may be competent to give testimony if they understand the 
nature of the oath); McGuff v. State, 7 So. 35, 37 (Ala. 1889) (“This court 
has accordingly followed, in substance, the rule laid down in Brasier’s case, 
[citing 1815 report and East’s 1803 report], where it was held that there was 
‘no precise or fixed rule as to the time within which infants are excluded 
from giving evidence . . . .’’’); Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 
(1895) (citing 1815 Leach’s report for its holding that there was no fixed age 
to give oath and finding no error in court finding five-year-old competent to 
testify in murder case); accord Piepke v. Philadelphia, 89 A. 124, 126 (Pa. 
1913) (“The modern law and practice follow Brasier’s case, 1 Leach’s Crown 
Law, 199 [1815 report], decided more than 100 years ago, where it was 
distinctly held for the first time, by an undivided court, that, where there is 
no precise or fixed rule as to the time within which infants are excluded from 
giving evidence . . . .”); State v. Southmayd, 158 N.W. 404, 404-05 (S.D. 
1916) (quoting Wheeler’s discussion of Brasier and finding no abuse of 
discretion in allowing six-year-old witness to testify in murder case); 
Leahman v. Broughton, 244 S.W. 403, 404 (Ky. Ct. App. 1922) (citing 
East’s 1803 report of Brasier in support of allowing child of any age to be 
sworn and finding court erred in refusing eight-year-old girl the opportunity 
to testify). 
131 Wheeler, 159 U.S. at 525. 
132 State v. Miller, 1 Del. Cas. 512, 512 (Del. 1814) (“In this case a 
child about nine years old, who knew not the nature or obligation of an oath, 
was not admitted to testify. For, 1 Hale P.C. 634 (examined by court without 
oath); contra, Brazier’s Case, Bull N.P. 293 . . . .”). 
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received, except when given on oath.”133 
2.  Brasier and Hearsay 
In the hundred years following framing and ratification of 
the Sixth Amendment, treatises and courts employed various 
interpretations of Brasier’s exclusion of the mother and lodger’s 
hearsay. As noted, there was confusion in the eighteenth century 
about whether Brasier involved hearsay. Leach’s 1789 and 1792 
reports of Brasier made no mention of the out-of-court 
statements (or the mother and lodger), though Blackstone in 
1783 made a general reference to hearsay. By 1800, Leach’s 
report began to mention hearsay (first in a footnote) and 
Blackstone’s report was appearing in other treatises, but the 
association of Brasier and hearsay appears not to have taken 
hold in England until 1803 when a new report of the case 
appeared in Edward Hyde East’s, A Treatise of the Pleas of the 
Crown.134 Citing the manuscript notes of Buller and Gould of 
the Twelve Judges (and the “amended” 1800 edition of Leach’s 
which contained the footnote mentioning the mother and lodger), 
                                                          
133 State v. Morea, 2 Ala. 275 (1841) (citing the 1789 version of 
Brasier). By 1901, however, confrontation rhetoric began finding its way into 
the oath issues. In State v. Lugar, 88 N.W. 333 (Iowa 1901), the defendant 
was charged with prostitution and a witness who inadvertently was not sworn 
gave “damaging” testimony against her. The court found that the admission 
of unsworn testimony was reversible error, citing the  1789 version of 
Brasier as a case reflecting that no unsworn testimony can be admitted. The 
decision, however, tied the oath issue to confrontation:  
The constitution of this state guaranties to every man accused of a 
crime the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, 
and this would be but a barren right, and afford the defendant 
no protection, if such witness may testify without being sworn, 
or without any way being subject to the penalties of perjury. 
Id. at 334. 
134 1 EDWARD HYDE EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 443-44 (London 
1803). The first American edition was published in 1806. 1 EDWARD HYDE 
EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 443-44 (Philadelphia, P Byren, Law Bookseller 
1806). Thanks to Robert Kry for providing me the London edition and for his 
helpful thoughts on East and other sections of this article. 
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East set forth another version of Brasier, this one adding new 
details about the trial and review by the Twelve Judges not 
present in any of the prior reports. Because of its importance, 
East’s discussion is set forth in full: 
The last case which has occurred on this doubtful 
subject is that of William Brazier, who was tried for 
assaulting Mary Harris, an infant of five years old, 
with intent to ravish her. The case on the part of the 
prosecution was proved by the mother of the child 
and another woman who lodged with her, to whom 
the child immediately on her coming home told all 
the circumstances of the injury done to her, and 
described the prisoner, who was a soldier, as the 
person who had committed it; but she did not know 
his name. 
The next day the prisoner was called from the guard 
by the serjeant, and shewn to the child, who 
immediately said that was the man. Two other 
soldiers had been before shewn to her, of whom she 
at once denied any knowledge. There was no fact or 
circumstance to confirm the account given by the girl 
that the prisoner was the man who committed the 
offense, except that he lodged where she described. 
That she had received some hurt was proved by a 
surgeon as well as by the two women. The child was 
coming from school when the prisoner attacked her. 
The school did not break up till four o’clock, and she 
was at home before five, and had no conversation or 
communication with the mother before she had told 
all that had passed. The prisoner was convicted. 
But Mr. Justice Buller reserved the above statement 
of facts for the opinion of the judges, whether this 
evidence ought to have been received, or was 
sufficient in point of law to be left to the jury. On the 
first day of Easter term 1779 the judges met on this 
subject, when all of them except Gould and Willes, 
Js. held that this evidence of the information of the 
child ought not to have been received, as she herself 
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was not heard on oath; as to which some, particularly 
Blackstone, Nares, Eyre and Buller Js. thought that if 
she appeared on examination to have been capable of 
distinguishing between good and evil, she might have 
been sworn. But as to that, others, particularly Gould 
and Willes Js. held that the presumption of law of 
want of discretion under the age of seven is 
conclusive; so as not to admit an infant under that age 
to be sworn on any examination as to her capacity. 
And as the information or narration from the child, 
Gould and Willes Js. held that it being recently after 
the fact, so that it excluded a possibility of practicing 
on her, it was a part of the fact or transaction itself, 
and therefore admissible: and Buller J., held the 
same, if by law the child could not be examined on 
oath. But as to what happened the next day, Gould J., 
thought it not admissible, by reason of the danger of 
her being influenced in the interval. 
But on the 29th [of] April all the judges being 
assembled, they unanimously agreed that a child of 
any age, if she were capable of distinguishing 
between good and evil, might be examined on oath; 
and consequently that evidence of what she had said 
ought not to have been received. And that a child of 
whatever age cannot be examined unless sworn. The 
prisoner was pardoned. 
It does not however appear to have been denied by 
any in the above case, that the fact of the child’s 
having complained of the injury recently after it was 
received is confirmatory evidence.135 
The East treatment of Brasier, therefore, departs 
significantly from the 1789 and 1792 reports in Leach’s. It cites 
the 1800 edition of Leach’s, which included a footnote 
mentioning a “manuscript note” of the case, suggesting that the 
mother and another witness provided hearsay. (The manuscript 
                                                          
135 1 EAST, supra note 134, at 443-44. 
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might be the notes of Buller and Gould cited by East). East is 
ambiguous on whether Mary Harris testified unsworn, yet 
reflects that the Twelve Judges were addressing both the age at 
which a child could be sworn and Hale’s argument that a child 
could testify unsworn. By italicizing the reference to the mother 
and the lodger, East may have been attempting to acknowledge 
that other reports did not mention them, and the emphasis was 
meant to put the issue to rest. Finally, East’s report appears to 
suggest an exception to barring admission of hearsay statements 
of unsworn children: evidence that the child had complained 
shortly after the rape, but not the details of the offense, might be 
admissible as “confirmatory evidence.”136 
The East report of Brasier became one of the most cited 
accounts of the case and resulted in Brasier being interpreted in 
nineteenth century treatises and cases for various propositions 
concerning hearsay law. For instance, the 1816 edition of 
Phillipps’s Law of Evidence cited East’s report of Brasier in its 
discussion of res gestae, noting that “on an indictment for rape, 
what the girl said recently after the fact (so that it excluded a 
possibility of practicing on her), has been held to be admissible 
in evidence, as part of the transaction.”137 Similarly, as various 
                                                          
136 Id. at 444. 
137 S.M. PHILLIPPS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 202 (John A. 
Dunlap ed., New York, Gould, Banks & Gould 1816). The 1838 edition of 
the treatise cites the East and 1815 reports of Brasier in the section 
concerning the law of competency: 
A more reasonable rule has since been adopted, and the 
competency of children is now regulated, not by their age, but 
by the degree of understanding which they appear to possess.  In 
Brazier’s case, on an indictment for assaulting an infant five 
years old with the intent to ravish her, all the judges agreed, that 
children of any age might be examined upon oath, if they were 
capable of distinguishing between good and evil, and possessed 
of sufficient knowledge of the nature and consequences of an 
oath, but that they could not in any case be examined without 
oath.  This is now the established rule, as well in criminal, as in 
civil cases, and it applies equally to capital offences as to 
offences of inferior nature. 
S. MARCH PHILLIPPS & ANDREW AMOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
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state-amici in Davis noted,138 the 1824 edition of Thomas 
Starkie’s influential treatise, A Practical Treatise on the Law of 
Evidence,139 cited Brasier for the proposition that, “where an 
immediate account is given, or complaint made, by an 
individual, of a personal injury committed against him, the fact 
of making the complaint immediately, and before it is likely that 
anything should have been contrived and devised for the private 
advantage of the party, is admissible in evidence; as upon an 
indictment for rape . . . .”140 
Cases from the late nineteenth century likewise cited East’s 
report of Brasier in terms of res gestae. Some courts permitted 
admission of testimony that the child had reported the offense 
soon after it occurred, but did not allow hearsay concerning the 
details of the crime;141 other courts more liberally allowed 
                                                          
EVIDENCE 5 (8th ed., London, Saunders and Benning, Law Booksellers 
1838). 
138 See Brief for the States of Ill. et al., supra note 10, at *7-8. 
139 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 149 (1st ed. 1824). 
140 Id. 
141 In State v. Ivins, 36 N.J.L. 233 (N.J. 1873), the defendant was tried 
for attempt to ravish an adult woman and the trial court permitted the 
admission of hearsay concerning both the fact that the complaint was made 
immediately after the occurrence and the particulars of the defendant’s 
alleged conduct. The court found that “the rule that in trials for rape, the fact 
that the woman alleged to have been violated, made complaint soon after the 
occurrence, is admissible as evidence on the part of the prosecution, is 
entirely settled, and is very familiar in practice. To this extent, hearsay 
evidence becomes admissible, and this departure from the ordinary rule 
seems justifiable on the ground, that in the natural course of things, if a 
woman has thus been foully wronged, she will almost necessarily disclose the 
fact.” Id. The court addressed whether this exception in rape cases should 
apply in attempts to commit a rape. “There does not appear to be much 
authority upon the subject, but the little that there is, favors the admissibility 
of the evidence. Brazier’s Case, reported in 1 East P.C. 443, tends evidently 
to this result . . . .” Id. at 234. The court applied the same rule for rape and 
attempted rape cases.  Notably, with regard to whether hearsay of the 
victim’s details of the offense were admissible, the court held that “[i]t is 
every day’s practice to exclude such narrations in trials for rape.” Id. at 235. 
Similarly, in Hornbeck v. State, 35 Ohio St. 277 (1879), the defendant was 
charged with intent to commit a rape and the alleged child victim was found 
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hearsay concerning the details of the offense.142 
                                                          
incompetent to testify. The trial court admitted hearsay evidence concerning 
what the child had said about the rape and the defendant was convicted. On 
appeal, the court noted the rule that “where the prosecutrix in a case of this 
nature has been examined as a witness, the declarations made by her 
immediately after the offense was committed, may be given in evidence, in 
the first instance, to corroborate her testimony.” Id. at 279. But since the 
child had not testified, the court had to consider the admission of the hearsay.  
In so doing, the court noted Lord Hale’s view that children should be allowed 
to testify unsworn and cited East’s report of Brasier as rejecting that rule. Id. 
The court also cited cases holding that “in cases of violence to the person, 
except when made in extremis, the declaration of the injured party are 
hearsay, and, therefore, inadmissible to prove the offense; and the fact that 
the declarent is incapable of taking an oath, by reason of imbecility, insanity, 
or infancy, will not justify a departure from the long and firmly-established 
rule of evidence on the subject.” Id. at 280.  The conviction was reversed 
and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 281; see also Lyles v. United States, 20 
App. D.C. 559, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1902) (“It seems to be settled that the fact 
that the prosecuting witness made complaint recently after the commission of 
the alleged crime is admissible generally, and as evidence in chief.” (citing 
East’s version of Brasier)). 
142 In Kenney v. State, 79 S.W. 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903), the 
defendant was charged with the rape of a three-year-old. At trial, the child 
was deemed incompetent and the child’s mother was permitted to testify that 
the child told her the defendant had committed the offense. The court found 
that: 
For aught that appears, the assault complained of had just been 
committed, and the child released by appellant, when she 
appeared before her mother and made said declarations. So that, 
so far as the time is concerned, while it was not exactly 
contemporaneous with the main fact (i.e., the outrage), yet it 
was so proximate to that event, and at least the first portion of 
the declaration apparently so spontaneous, as to make it come 
within the rule of res gestae, as laid down by this court. 
Id. at 818. The court recognized that by not requiring a contemporaneous 
declaration it was departing from the common law, but nonetheless found the 
hearsay statements res gestae. The court also addressed the appellant’s 
argument that, since the child was incapable of giving sworn testimony, 
hearsay of what an incompetent witness said likewise should not be received. 
The court held, however, that “wherever the testimony of an infant is a part 
of the res gestae, it is introduceable, notwithstanding the fact that the witness 
was incompetent to take an oath.”  Id. The court distinguished common law 
cases following a different rule on the ground that they did not involve res 
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Other courts and commentators of the period cited Brasier 
for a more limited proposition. St. George Tucker’s 1803 
American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries (based on the 
1783 English edition) arguably suggested that the case simply 
meant that if a child lacked the capacity to be sworn, the 
statements the child told others likewise could not be 
received.143 Phillipps’s treatise took a similar view: “When a 
child from defect of understanding or instruction is unfit to be 
sworn, it follows as a necessary consequence, that any account, 
which it may have given to others, of the transaction, ought not 
to be admitted.”144 There were also cases to the same effect.145 
                                                          
gestae.  It referenced East’s version of Brasier in support of admitting 
hearsay of those unsworn as res gestae: “it had been considered, allowable 
on an indictment for an assault on an infant five years old with intent to 
ravish her, to give evidence of the child having complained of the injury 
recently thereafter . . . .” Id. at 819. The conviction was affirmed.  A 
dissenting opinion argued that the majority’s decision was not sound and the 
law was clear that “the statement of an incompetent witness, a child, made 
immediately after the occurrence [is] inadmissible.” Id. at 820 (Davidson, 
P.J., dissenting). The dissent claimed this was the rule at common law, citing 
East’s report of Brasier and the Travers case. The judge quoted nearly the 
entire section of East describing Brasier and concluded that “at common law 
[there was] the unqualified rule rejecting this character of testimony.” Id. at 
822. 
143 See 5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 214. 
144 PHILLIPPS, supra note 137, at 6 (1838 ed.). 
145 See Oregon v. Tom, A Chinaman, 8 Or. 177, 180 (1879) (“The rule 
that the declarations of one incompetent to testify cannot be admitted in 
evidence, is now the established doctrine in the States of the Union . . . .” 
(discussing Blackstone’s reference to Brasier)). In Weldon v. State, 32 Ind. 
81 (1869), the court held that it was error to admit declarations of an 
incompetent child to prove charges of assault and battery with intent to 
commit a rape. The court noted that Hale argued to allow children to testify 
unsworn and that parents were permitted to testify about the child’s account 
of the rape, but that these ideas had been rejected: 
That being the true rule in case of a person immature in 
intellect, I cannot see why the reason of the rule does not apply 
with as much force to exclude all evidence of the declarations, 
assertions, or signs made . . . by a person who is incompetent to 
be sworn as a witness. 
Id. at 83. Notably, Weldon quotes another case for the following: “At the 
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Still, some treatises and cases interpreted Brasier’s exclusion 
of hearsay on best evidence/necessity-type grounds. In other 
words, the mother and lodger’s testimony was excluded 
principally because the court had not first attempted to see 
whether the secondary evidence was needed when it failed to 
assess Mary Harris’s capacity to take the oath. In 1827, for 
instance, Jeremy Bentham, citing the 1800 Leach’s report of 
Brasier, suggested that the hearsay of the mother and lodger was 
excluded because the trial judge had not tried to determine 
whether the child was competent to testify: 
[T]wo conditions precedent have been annexed. One 
is, that the child shall have taken oath; i.e. gone 
through the same ceremony by which testimonial 
relation is preceded in other instance. To this 
operation, had it been performed [in Brasier], there 
could have been no objection.146 
Though much later in time, a court in 1911 interpreted 
Brasier in a similar way: 
As far back as Brazier’s Case, 1 East P.C. 443, it 
seems to have been virtually allowed that in such 
cases proof of the complaint and its details might be 
received, though in that instance it was held improper 
because the child was not shown incompetent to 
testify; which in effect was saying . . . that a rule of 
evidence dictated by necessity becomes inapplicable 
wherever that necessity does not exist.147 
                                                          
time of Brazier’s Case, it seems to have been considered, that, as the child 
was incompetent to take an oath, what she said was receivable in evidence. 
The law was not so well settled then as it is now.” Id. (quoting Regina v. 
Guttridges, 9 C. & P. 471). 
146 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 149 (1827). 
Because the treatise relied on the 1800 report of the case, it appears to 
assume the child in Brasier testified. See id. (“For, with the approbation of 
the twelve judges, in the case of an infant of no more than seven years old 
[citing 1800 report of Brasier and another case] (how much under is not 
said), this evidence was received.”).  
147 Commonwealth v. Zypa, 3 Berks 350 (Pa. O & T 1911), available at 
1911 WL 3681. In Zypa, the defendant was charged with raping a seven-
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Finally, some courts interpreted Brasier as involving the 
right to submit hearsay corroborating a witness’s testimony. In 
1850, the Supreme Court included East’s report of Brasier in a 
string cite in support of the proposition that where a witness is 
impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, evidence that the 
witness previously gave a consistent statement is inadmissible.148 
                                                          
year-old girl, the child was deemed incompetent, and the court permitted the 
girl’s mother to recount statements the girl had made about the alleged rape. 
The court addressed the issue of whether “it was proper to receive and 
submit to the jury evidence of what the child had said concerning the injury 
done her as proof of defendant’s guilt.” Id. at *1. The court discussed several 
relevant legal principles. First, the court noted the rule allowing hearsay 
testimony of the act that the complaint of the rape was made, but excluding 
the substance of the details of the offense. Id. Second, the court noted the 
rule that where the witness had testified and the testimony attacked, courts 
allowed the admission of hearsay to corroborate the testimony. Id. at *2-3. 
Third, the court found that where the witness was unavailable because of lack 
of competence because of young age, “necessity” might permit such 
testimony since otherwise perpetrators would benefit simply because of the 
nature of the crime and age of their victims. Id. at *4. The court found that 
(East’s report of) Brasier supported admission of such statements, even 
though the statements there were excluded because the court failed to 
determine if the child was competent: 
As far back as Brazier’s Case, 1 East P.C. 443, it seems to have 
been virtually allowed that in such cases proof of the complaint 
and its details might be received, though in that instance it was 
held improper because the child was not shown incompetent to 
testify; which in effect was but saying . . . that a rule of 
evidence dictated by necessity becomes inapplicable wherever 
that necessity does not exist. 
Id. at 5. Fourth, the court noted cases considering hearsay statements made 
spontaneously after events might be admitted as res gestae. Id. at 6. The 
court ultimately held that hearsay of a rape victim may be received in 
connection with other evidence that tended to show a rape was committed and 
that the accused was in a position to commit it. Id. at 7. Though finding no 
error in the admission of the testimony, the court vacated the conviction on 
the ground that hearsay tending to exculpate the defendant was not admitted 
and, because it too was res gestae, it should have been admitted to give the 
jury a full picture of the situation. Id. at 7-8. Beyond that, other 
circumstances, including the unpreparedness of the defendant’s lawyer and 
the incompetency of an interpreter warranted a retrial. Id.  
148 Conrad v. Griffey, 52 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1850) (“But in other places, 
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This may suggest that the Supreme Court understood that 
Brasier involved the child testifying and the exclusion of the 
testimony of the mother and lodger was based on the testimony’s 
status as improper prior consistent statements of the child. 
Thus, post-ratification interpretation of Brasier in England 
and the states on hearsay is as diverse as it is irrelevant to the 
understanding of the case in 1791, given that most 
interpretations of the case were based on East’s 1803 modified 
report or on the altered 1815 Leach’s report that appeared more 
than a decade after ratification of the Confrontation Clause. 
II.  LESSONS FROM BRASIER? 
Putting aside my interpretation of Brasier, the case serves as 
an apt case study on the practical issues of a criminal procedure 
framework that requires overworked prosecutors, defense 
lawyers, and judges to determine the “Framers’ design” to 
resolve what statements are, and are not, “testimonial” under 
the Confrontation Clause. 
The most striking example of the practical problem with 
determining authentic original meaning is that all participants in 
Davis failed to note that the reports of Brasier in print at 
ratification,149 wherein the child reportedly testified, effectively 
takes the case out of the realm of confrontation analysis. That 
the entire debate is based on the potentially flawed premise that 
the child did not appear at trial is telling. It illustrates that 
research into historic sources is essentially a specialty, foreign to 
                                                          
as in England, such evidence, though at one time considered competent, and 
especially in criminal cases, is now even there excluded.” (citing, among 
others, Brazier’s Case, 1 East P.C. 444) (citations omitted)); see also Head 
v. State, 44 Miss. 731, 751 (1870) (“For the purpose of discrediting a 
witness, it is competent to prove that he made discordant statements, at other 
times and places, but to reestablish creditability, or to support what he has 
deposed on the trial, it is inadmissible to prove that he has made substantially 
the same statements, to a third person. Many years ago the British courts 
received such testimony; afterwards its propriety was doubted, and finally 
repudiated. The weight of authority and reason is against it.” (citing, among 
other cases, East’s version of Brasier)). 
149 See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. 
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most in practice, and it counsels against lending too much 
weight to sources that, in many respects, may have the 
reliability of a modern day Internet blog.150 Though legal 
historians might know to look for earlier editions or manuscripts 
of reported cases, and may be able to explain how and why 
changes such as those in Brasier occurred over time, criminal 
lawyers in the trenches—and the judges deciding these issues—
cannot reasonably be expected to have the time to find, much 
less trace the origins of, each and every common law case that 
seems significant to the confrontation issue before them.  
Indeed, many common law sources are not readily 
accessible. Simply tracking down the multiple reports of Brasier 
and determining which versions were available from 1789 to 
1791 required consultation with a legal history scholar and 
assistance from my law firm’s London office library as well as a 
law school library where I have research privileges.151 It 
required sources from specialized subscription databases and 
obtaining materials (unavailable on-line) from the rare book 
collections of libraries and historical societies. 
Brasier also illustrates another practical issue with a rigid 
originalism-based legal framework: determining the date at 
which to view the “Framers’ understanding.” As noted, to make 
this determination the Supreme Court often looks at 1791, the 
year that the Bill of Rights was ratified.152 Others have 
persuasively argued that “the original meaning has to refer to 
the public meaning of the text at the time the First Congress 
approved the language of the amendments—the date the text was 
framed.”153 Under this approach, September 25, 1789, the date 
when the text of the Bill of Rights including the Confrontation 
Clause was approved by the First Congress, becomes the 
                                                          
150 See Davies, Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 26, at 390 n.96 
(“Relying upon post-framing editions of treatises that were initially published 
prior to the framing can result in serious errors because new material was 
sometimes added, or alterations were sometimes made, to the pre-framing 
text”). 
151 See supra author’s footnote. 
152 See supra note 18. 
153 Davies, What Did the Framers Know, supra note 26, at 158. 
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relevant date.154 After the cutoff date is determined, moreover, 
there is debate about how long before or after that date treatise 
and case discussions reliably reflect the Framers’ understanding 
of the law.155 
These timing issues have practical significance, again 
illustrated by Brasier. The first report in Brasier that appeared 
in Leach’s Crown Cases became available in London no earlier 
than May 1789.156 Accordingly, given the communication 
difficulties of the era, it is unlikely that the original report of 
Brasier (even if it had been the same as the 1815 report) would 
have reached the First Congress in Philadelphia before 
September.157 Unaware of Brasier, the Framers likely would 
have understood the law as set forth in Sir Matthew Hale’s 
treatise and as restated in English and early American editions of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries that flooded the states and that 
                                                          
154 See id. at 159. 
155 Compare Davies, What Did the Framers Know, supra note 26, at 
179-80 (arguing that state cases decided more than a few decades after the 
framing are invalid evidence of original meaning) with Kry, supra note 26, at 
47 (disagreeing with Professor Davies concerning whether post-ratification 
sources are valid evidence of original meaning). Mr. Kry, for instance, takes 
issue with Professor Davies’s argument that the Radbourne, Woodcock, and 
Dingler decisions from post-1787 “are not valid evidence of original meaning 
because the reports would not have been widely available in the United States 
when the Sixth Amendment was framed.” Kry, supra note 26, at 522 (citing 
Davies, What Did the Framers Know, supra note 26, at 153-62). Kry 
responds that “[b]ecause colonial lawyers were directly exposed to English 
practices and ideas, English evidence is relevant whether or not it appeared in 
a published treatise or case report shipped to the colonies,” particularly 
where a case in question merely embodied preexisting English law. Id. 
(“Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler do not purport to change Marian 
committal procedure in any way they simply confirm what that procedure 
already was”). Davies, in turn, replies that “Hening made no mention in 
1794 of Radbourne or Woodcock, five years after the reports of those cases 
were initially published in Leach’s reports of Old Bailey cases (Dingler still 
had not been published).” Davies, Revisiting Fictional Originalism, supra 
note 26, at 620. The timing debates are particularly relevant in Brasier, 
which reflected a change in law. Whether the Framers were aware of the 
case as opposed to the law reported by Hale and Blackstone is significant. 
156 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. 
157 See Davies, What Did the Framers Know, supra note 26, at 109-12. 
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followed Hale’s view that “the law allows what the child told 
her mother, or other relations, to be given in evidence.”158 As 
the Supreme Court recognized fifty years ago, “two of the 
greatest English jurists, Lord Chief Justice Hale and Sir William 
Blackstone . . . exerted considerable influence on the 
Founders . . . .”159 Indeed, colonial justice of the peace 
manuals, which “were probably the sources regarding criminal 
procedure that were most accessible to members of the Framers’ 
generation,”160 arguably reflected some debate over whether 
children in sexual abuse cases could testify unsworn, but made 
no mention of Brasier or otherwise questioned Hale’s 
recognition that the law allowed child hearsay in sexual abuse 
cases.161 On the other hand, there was some reference to Brasier 
and hearsay in later editions of Blackstone,162 so one cannot 
foreclose some knowledge of the case in America beyond 
Leach’s reports. But even the post-Brasier English sources 
                                                          
158 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. The defendants in Davis 
acknowledged that before Brasier courts often admitted hearsay testimony of 
children in rape cases, but reasonably concluded that Brasier changed the 
rules. See discussion supra note 35 and accompanying test. To be sure, there 
was a notable absence in Old Bailey reports after Brasier where hearsay was 
admitted in rape cases. On the other hand, this may not reflect any change in 
practice of the time, but rather, how cases were reported. “After about 1790, 
most reports of such cases in the Old Bailey Proceedings give no details of 
the offense, and often do not give even the name of the victim. It is likely 
that many cases after this date represented instances of child molestation.” 
Simpson, supra note 49, at 191-92. Further, in the years following Brasier, 
courts bent over backwards to find young children competent to testify, going 
so far as to defer trials while children deemed incompetent received 
instruction on the nature and consequences of taking the oath. See 
Commonwealth v. Lynes, 8 N.E. 408 (Mass. 1886). In short, even if Brasier 
did change the rules in England, it is questionable whether that was generally 
understood in 1791 in England, much less the states. 
159 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 26 (1957). 
160 Thomas Davies, The Fictional Character of Law and Order 
Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era 
Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 
280 (2002). 
161 See discussion supra notes 98, 118-20. 
162 See discussion supra notes 117, 120. 
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before and immediately after ratification were inconsistent on the 
discussion of Brasier, with some citing only to the report of the 
case where Mary Harris testified and others noting Blackstone’s 
generalized reference to hearsay. Conflicting sources and 
multiple editions of case reporters and treatises, therefore, 
require the virtually impossible determination of what sources 
the Framers would and would not have considered, something 
particularly difficult where, as with Brasier, the case would have 
reflected a change in the common law concerning out-of-court 
statements. Simply put, even if Brasier did change the rules in 
England, it is questionable whether that was generally 
understood in 1791 in England, much less the states. 
Finally, the law shortly after ratification, as the Court 
reviewed in Crawford, would bear little on the Framers’ 
understanding. Post-framing law and commentary dealt 
principally with the 1803 report of Brasier in East or the 1815 
report reprinted in the English Reports, which injected the case 
into the law of hearsay.163 
All of this is not to say that history is irrelevant to an 
understanding of confrontation or other rights, or to suggest that 
every historical inquiry will be as complex as Brasier.164 Nor is 
                                                          
163 See supra Part I.D.2. 
164 That said, a recent dialogue between Professor Davies, who criticized 
the history relied on by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Crawford, and 
Robert Kry, Justice Scalia’s law clerk during the Crawford term, reflects 
practical complexities similar to those illustrated by Brasier. In a recent 
article, Professor Davies makes a persuasive historical argument that the 
Supreme Court’s history in Crawford was inaccurate. Davies, Not the 
Framers’ Design, supra note 26. Mr. Kry’s rebuttal relies on impressive 
research into framing-era law and practices. Kry, supra note 26. Reading 
both pieces, I imagined how a busy prosecutor or defense lawyer could be 
expected to properly research similar historic issues, or how a law clerk or 
judge would get to the bottom of the competing arguments in the pieces 
(considering caseload demands). Mr. Kry’s rebuttal, for instance, included 
analyses of multiple editions of several cases (several of limited general 
availability) that changed over time (like Brasier). He also scoured the Old 
Bailey Session Papers, obtained committal depositions from the London 
Metropolitan Archives, and engaged in an analysis of how Sir Francis Buller 
(the trial judge in Brasier) incorrectly reported certain cases. See Kry, supra 
note 26, at 18-19, 28. 
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the fact that a legal framework is difficult to apply necessarily a 
sound basis to abandon it.  
The question remains, however, whether the real-world 
limitations of requiring proof of “original meaning,” as the 
exclusive analytical mode will encourage unwarranted 
assumptions about cases or lead to the creation of shorthand tests 
based on inauthentic history, such as the recent state high court 
case that simply presumed that Brasier meant that statements to 
non-law enforcement personnel could be testimonial in nature.165 
Eighteenth century authorities such as Brasier change over time, 
as courts and scholars rely on different versions of the case or 
misinterpretations of the case found in treatises. Given the 
nature of the sources, it may be possible for advocates to 
construct a compelling case of “original meaning” for either side 
of an issue in cases where the common law is not clear. The 
framework, therefore, may well lead to the very “unpredictable” 
and “amorphous” framework166 Crawford sought to replace. 
CONCLUSION 
There may never be a consensus on what Brasier really 
meant at the time of the framing, which is something originalists 
can probably live with.167 A more basic question is whether a 
legal framework that requires lawyers and judges to essentially 
become historians could in fact be no better than the 
“reliability” approach overruled by Crawford. To be sure, the 
reliability framework was far from perfect. Yet, the current 
rigid history-based doctrine, which requires the time to locate 
and digest complex, unfamiliar historic materials that are filled 
with traps for the unwary, appears no better suited to limit 
short-hand legal tests, selective interpretation by advocates, and 
results-oriented decision-making. The current framework, 
moreover, may provide a means to legitimize such practices by 
shrouding them in “history,” authentic or not. 
                                                          
165 See supra text accompanying note 40. 
166 See supra note 5.  
167 See discussion supra note 27. 
